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Technology’s Influence on Federal
Sentencing: Past, Present, and Future
By Matthew G. Rowland *
Abstract
The comprehensive reforms that govern today’s federal
sentencing processes were fashioned nearly forty years ago. Those
reforms were designed to address concerns regarding the
effectiveness, transparency, and fairness of the preexisting
indeterminant sentencing system. Today, criticisms are
mounting against the very reforms that were once held out to save
the sentencing process. The more determinant system is being
accused of being biased against minorities, overly harsh, and
costly.
This Article explores how the criminal justice system
might look to technology and build on the practical experience
from the indeterminant and determinant systems. Tools such as
Artificial Intelligence (AI) can help improve many aspects of the
sentencing process and allow for continued learning. While some
anxiously fear AI will serve as a robotic judge, it is better
characterized as a tool that can enhance human
decision-making. In the sentencing context, the technology can
make sentencing more informed, with greater safeguards against
abuse, faster and more impactful relative to the goals for
sentencing established by Congress and expected by the public.

*
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A Monty Python skit on the history of manned flight begins
with a medieval king shouting “fly” and kicking a man off a cliff.
“Not as successful as hoped for,” remarks the king. The skit goes
on to cite advancements in the accoutrements of flight and
depicts a man going through an airport check-in, handing his
boarding pass to a flight attendant, and boarding what appears
to be a modern aircraft. He sits down just to hear the king behind
him shout “fly,” and the man is kicked off a cliff. “Nope. Still not
got it,” says the king. 1
I. Introduction
Sentencing is more of an art than a science. What
constitutes an appropriate sentence is a matter of opinion, and
the impact of sentencing decisions is far from understood.
Criticisms of sentencing abound, as do criticisms of the
criticisms. The good news is that crime rates are low, 2 and
presumably the federal criminal justice system had a role in
making that happen. Also, we have made progress regarding
transparency and better structuring of judgment. 3 In addition,
we have created a stronger foundation for research. Much of
that progress has been driven by technological innovation. It is
technology that is now poised to take federal sentencing to the
next level.
The comprehensive reforms that govern today’s federal
sentencing processes were fashioned nearly forty years ago. 4
The reforms were designed to address concerns regarding the
effectiveness, transparency, and fairness of the preexisting

1.
Terry Gilliam, The Miracle of Flight, YOUTUBE (Dec. 19, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I4eVkanDkgg (last visited Mar. 19, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/5BC6-CMSF].
2.
See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 2019 JANUARY–JUNE PRELIMINARY
SEMIANNUAL UNIFORM CRIME REPORT tbl.3 (2019), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-inthe-u.s/2019/preliminary-report/tables/table-3/table-3.xls (last visited Feb. 17,
2020) (showing that the crime statistics for the nation are down year over year)
[https://perma.cc/435N-VDGX].
3.
See id. (disclosing crime statistics).
4.
See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(setting forth Sentencing Reform and dictating federal sentencing).
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indeterminant sentencing system. 5 The political impetus for the
reforms drew from voter concerns about crime. 6 In the two
decades leading up to the reforms, the violent crime rate in the
United States increased 271 percent, with homicides rising from
9,110 to 23,040. 7
Yet another important but underappreciated factor shaping
the reforms was technology. Many of the reforms put into place
in the 1980s simply would not have been possible when the
indeterminant system was created decades before. The
indeterminant system was a product of its time, and arguably
the best option considering the tools that were available. While

5.
See Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Sentencing Guidelines: Control of Discretion
in Federal Sentencing, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 12 (1978) (discussing concerns of
the federal sentencing system).
Indeterminate sentencing strikes most knowledgeable observers as
irrational. Generally, legislatures fix no specific penalty for a crime;
rather, a maximum, and sometimes a minimum, limit is set. In
addition to the wide latitude of possible punishment, no coherent
goals are provided to structure and guide the discretion of
sentencing judges and parole boards. Because of the absence of
goals and purposes for sentences of imprisonment, indeterminate
schemes tend to foster unfair and inconsistent sentencing decisions
between, and even within, courts.
Id.
6.
See Steven V. Roberts, Crime an Increasingly Compelling Political
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1982, at B12 (“‘I don’t care whose poll you look at,’
said Representative William J. Hughes, a New Jersey Democrat. ‘Some of
them show that crime is more important than national defense.’”); see also
Richard Neely, The Politics of Crime, ATLANTIC ONLINE (Aug. 1982), https://
www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/politics/crime/neelycri.htm (last visited Apr. 1,
2020) (“Through at least the past decade, no public problem has worried
Americans more persistently than crime. When people are asked in opinion
surveys to list the problems that concern them most, the threat of crime
typically comes at or near the top of the list.”) [https://perma.cc/Z7BR-4NR8];
see also Francesco Bruno, Combatting Drug Abuse and Related Crime, UNITED
NATIONS DEF. RES. INST., July 1984, at 31 (“[T]he constant rise in criminality,
in the broadest sense of the term, is one of the most important preoccupations
of the present day.”).
7.
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, FED. BUREAU
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr (last visited Feb. 17,
2020) (explaining how to view crime statistics) [https://perma.cc/JPT4-23CY].
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the indeterminant system was ultimately vilified 8 and scrapped,
it continues to offer valuable lessons for the ongoing evolution
of sentencing.
Ironically, criticisms are now mounting against the very
reforms that were once held out to save the sentencing process.
The more determinant system is being accused of being biased
against minorities, 9 overly harsh, 10 and costly. 11 Discussion of
those concerns may be eclipsing the substantive advancements
made by the determinant approach.
What to do? As there is very little new under the sun in
terms of sentencing philosophy, the answer is to look to
technology and build on the practical experience from the
indeterminant and determinant systems.
Tools such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) can help improve
many aspects of the sentencing process and allow for continued
learning. While some anxiously fear AI will serve as a robotic
8.
See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 884
(referring to the indeterminant sentencing system as an “embarrassment” and
“sham”); see also Tyler, Jr., supra note 5, at 12 (describing indeterminant
sentencing as “irrational”).
9.
See Sonja B. Starr & M.M. Rehavi, Racial Disparity in Federal
Criminal Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1354 (2014) (explaining how
system reforms have affected minorities); see also Richard D. Hartley,
Inter-District Differences and Extra-Legal Disparity in Federal Sentencing, 20
CRIMINOLOGY, CRIM. JUST., L. & SOC’Y 46, 48 (2019) (attributing some of the
sentencing disparity to extra-judicial factors, including application of
statutory minimums as well as prosecutorial charging decisions).
10.
See Marc Mauer, Long-Term Sentences: Time to Reconsider the Scale
of Punishment, THE SENT’G PROJECT (Nov. 5, 2018), https://
www.sentencingproject.org/publications/long-term-sentences-timereconsider-scale-punishment (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) (showing that the
revised prison terms for drug offenses are still harsh) [https://perma.cc/2HHNE5JM].
11.
See generally NANCY LAVIGNE & JULIE SAMUELS, THE GROWTH &
INCREASING COST OF THE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM: DRIVERS AND POTENTIAL
SOLUTIONS (2012), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/26191
/412693-The-Growth-amp-Increasing-Cost-of-the-Federal-Prison-SystemDrivers-and-Potential-Solutions.PDF (analyzing the amount spent by the
federal government on the Bureau of Prisons budget and determining the cost
associated with different types of incarceration) [https://perma.cc/2NYAU2ZN].
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judge, it is better characterized as a tool that can enhance
human decision-making. Ironically, most members of the public
already use AI themselves in a productive fashion; they just may
not know it. 12 In the sentencing context, the technology can
make sentencing more informed, with greater safeguards
against abuse, faster and more impactful relative to the goals
for sentencing established by Congress and expected by the
public.
II. Background
Sentencing can easily be mistaken for a purely judicial
function. It is more accurately considered a crossroad where
operation of all three branches of government meet. 13
Sentencing is not a standalone activity and if significant change
in sentencing outcomes is desired, involvement of all three
branches is necessary.
A. The Legislative Branch
Congress has the most crucial role. Congress defines what
constitutes a crime, prescribes penalties, dictates procedures,
and allocates funds to perform and execute sentencing. 14 To the
12.
See Jackie Snow, Most Americans are Already Using AI, MIT TECH.
REV. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/f/610438/mostamericans-are-already-using-ai/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) (reporting that a
survey by Gallup shows that most Americans use AI and suggesting that this
means that Americans are comfortable with using AI) [https://perma.cc/7B5YNC3B]; see also Brad Gaines, A.I. Is Here, And It’s Been Labeled The 4th
Industrial Revolution, RESET STRATEGIES (Apr. 13, 2018), https://
resetstrategies.com/ai-4th-industrial-revolution/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2020)
(stating that examples of AI-based products that are frequently used by
consumers include Uber and Lyft, Amazon, Expedia and Airbnb, Turbotax,
Spotify, and Netflix) [https://perma.cc/PGY8-4SE4].
13.
See Paul Rosenzweig, Sentencing Authority and the Separation of
Powers: “Who Decides Sentences at the Front End?,” HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov.
12, 2003), https://www.heritage.org/testimony/sentencing-authority-and-theseparation-powers-who-decides-sentences-the-front-end (last visited Feb. 17,
2020) (discussing the separation of powers and how each branch plays a role
in sentencing) [https://perma.cc/3J6V-QYKH].
14.
See generally Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing:
The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences,
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degree discretion is required, Congress exercises it or directs
who will, and in what manner it should be applied. 15
B. The Executive Branch
The executive branch, primarily through the Department of
Justice, investigates violations of law, brings charges in federal
court, and advocates for what it considers an appropriate
sentence. 16 Maximum, and sometimes minimum, penalties are

and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 185 (1993) (discussing the federal sentencing system and determining
the effectiveness of the guidelines the U.S. Sentencing Commission sets forth);
see also Publius Huldah, What Criminal Laws Are Congress Authorized to
Make?,
TENTH
AMEND.
CTR.
(June
20,
2015),
https://
tenthamendmentcenter.com/2015/06/20/what-criminal-laws-are-congressauthorized-to-make/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2020) (discussing the five categories
of powers under which Congress can make criminal laws) [https://perma.cc
/S9NP-UJKW]; see also Crime and Punishment, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST.
(Dec. 29, 2019), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1
/section-1/crime-and-punishment (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) (“Congress must
provide by statute that violation of the statute’s terms—or of valid regulations
issued pursuant thereto—shall constitute a crime, and the statute must also
specify a permissible range of penalties.”) [https://perma.cc/T9US-9WX3];
Mike Crowley & Ed Chung, Congress Can Lead Criminal Justice Reform
Through Funding Choices, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 7, 2017, 9:56 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2017/09/07
/438570/congress-can-lead-criminal-justice-reform-funding-choices/
(last
visited Feb. 17, 2020) (stating that appropriation laws passed by Congress “not
only controls the funding levels for federal criminal justice entities but also
sets the amounts available to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for grants
to state and local government counterparts as well as researchers and service
providers.”) [https://perma.cc/KN3S-75XV].
15.
See Rosenzweig, supra note 13 (“[M]ost of the discretion about the
most fundamental choice—whether to jail or not—is exercised at the
definitional level by Congress); see also Hatch, supra note 14 (examining the
effectiveness of the federal sentencing system and the guidelines it sets forth).
16.
See 28 U.S.C. § 31-40A (2018) (providing a source of authority of the
Department of Justice); see also Mission Statement, DEP’T OF JUST., https://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/status/mission/mdoj.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2020) (“The Department of Justice, established in 1870, represents the
citizens of the United States in enforcing the law in the public interest and
plays a key role in providing protection against criminal activity.”) [https://
perma.cc/WSG9-ERJZ].
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established by Congress and embedded in individual statutes. 17
Consequently, which offense prosecutors choose to pursue is a
critical decision influencing sentencing. 18 Critics have
questioned prosecutors’ level of discretion in this regard and the
impact it has on plea agreements and, in turn, sentences
defendants receive. 19
17.
See Step 10: Sentencing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov
/usao/justice-101/sentencing (last visited Jan. 29, 2020) (outlining how
“Congress has established minimum and maximum punishments for many
crimes which the judge uses to craft a sentence”) [https://perma.cc/7KRJGANA].
18.
As illustrated, if a hypothetical defendant is arrested for selling one
hundred grams of heroin, prosecutors could charge the defendant either under
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), which carries a maximum prison term of 20 years and
no mandatory minimum, or under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) which has a
maximum prison term of 40 years and a mandatory minimum 5 years.
Defendants who plead guilty are less likely to face the mandatory minimum
while those who go to trial are more likely to face a mandatory minimum
prison term. See Michael. Tonry, Mandatory Penalties, 16 CRIME & JUST. 243,
255–56 (1992) (presenting data from a random sample from the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, revealing that there were “clear indications that
prosecutors often do not file charges that carry mandatory minimums when
the evidence would have supported such charges” and prosecutors “used
mandatory provisions tactically to induce guilty pleas”).
19.
See Brian D. Johnson, Plea-Trial Differences in Federal Punishment:
Research and Policy Implications, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 256, 259 (2019)
(evaluating trial-penalty estimates); see also An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How
US Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty, HUMAN RTS.
WATCH (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/05/offer-you-cantrefuse/how-us-federal-prosecutors-force-drug-defendants-plead (last visited
Jan. 29, 2020) [hereinafter An Offer You Can’t Refuse] (reviewing the
“empirical evidence on the presence of a federal-trial penalty”) [https://
perma.cc/YZC3-9F2W]; see also ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE
POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (describing
how prosecutors are the most powerful officials in the criminal justice system);
see also Stephen E. Vance et al., Weighing the Value of the Bargain:
Prosecutorial Discretion After Sentencing Guidelines, 30 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y
REV. 1086, 1086–108 (2019) (seeking to quantify the amount of discretionary
authority transferred from judges to prosecutors under the guidelines); see
also Mario V. Cano, Prosecutorial Discretion across Federal Sentencing
Reforms: Immediate and Enduring Effects of Unwarranted Disparity (Dec.
2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University) (on file with
Arizona State University) (discussing the implications of United States v.
Booker and how no alteration in “disparities associated imprisonment
outcomes” is apparent).
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The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), a component of the
Department of Justice, enforces terms of imprisonment that are
imposed. 20 Discretionary decisions by the BOP are significant
and include inmates’ placement and conditions of confinement,
including in some instances, early release. 21
C. The Judicial Branch
The judiciary applies the Constitution, statutes, applicable
caselaw, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
criminal charges brought. Judges, the main actors within the
judiciary, also assign legal counsel to defendants who cannot
afford their own attorney. 22 Judges preside over courtroom
proceedings, decide which defendants should be released
pending trial and on what conditions, and impose sentences
upon those convicted of federal crimes. If probation or another
form of post-conviction community supervision is imposed,
judges have the authority to modify, revoke, or terminate those
terms for cause. 23
20.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4041–4050 (2018) (laying out chapter 303 of the U.S.
Code regarding the duties and policies of individuals in the Bureau of Prisons);
see also FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, ABOUT THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 1
(2015), https://www.bop.gov/resources/pdfs/ipaabout.pdf (stating that the
BOP’s mission is “to provide more progressive and humane care for federal
inmates, to professionalize the prison service, and to ensure consistent and
centralized administration of . . . Federal prisons”) [https://perma.cc/574HM8KG].
21.
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-320, BUREAU
OF PRISONS: ELIGIBILITY AND CAPACITY IMPACT USE OF FLEXIBILITIES TO REDUCE
INMATES’ TIME IN PRISON (2012) (discussing the results of the BOP’s
discretionary practices).
22.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 601–998 (outlining Part III of Title 28 of the U.S.
Code regarding court officers and employees); see also Defender Services, U.S.
CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/defender-services (last visited
Jan. 30, 2020) (“The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees an accused the right to representation by counsel in serious
criminal prosecutions. The responsibility for appointing counsel in federal
criminal proceedings for those unable to bear the cost of representation has
historically rested in the federal judiciary.”) [https://perma.cc/2BH5-TQ2H].
23.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 (regarding revoking or modifying probation
or supervised release); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3565, 3582 (discussing revocation
of probation and the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment).
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The United States Sentencing Commission is an
independent agency within the judiciary that promulgates
guidelines and policy statements to assist in the sentencing
decision. 24 At one point, the Commission’s guidelines were
considered binding on judges, but now, they are advisory. 25
The United States Probation and Pretrial Services System
is another component of the judiciary whose mission it is to
provide judges objective information with which to make
pretrial release and sentencing decisions. 26 Probation and
pretrial services officers also monitor any defendants
conditionally released to the community by judges pending trial
or as part of probation or supervised release. 27

24.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991−998 (2018) (setting forth the purposes and
powers of the U.S. Sentencing Commission); see also Mission, U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/about-page (last visited Jan. 30, 2020)
(describing the Commissions “principal purposes”) [https://perma.cc/9Z2EPR79].
The Commission’s principal purposes are: 1. to establish sentencing
policies and practices for the federal courts, including guidelines to
be consulted regarding the appropriate form and severity of
punishment for offenders convicted of federal crimes; 2. to advise
and assist Congress and the executive branch in the development
of effective and efficient crime policy; and 3. to collect, analyze,
research, and distribute a broad array of information on federal
crime and sentencing issues . . . .
Id.
25.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005) (discussing how
the Guidelines are effectively advisory requiring a sentencing court to consider
Guidelines ranges).
26.
See Probation and Pretrial Services, U.S. CTS., https://
www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/probation-and-pretrial-services (last visited
Jan. 30, 2020) (outlining the duties, history, mission, and other aspects of the
department) [https://perma.cc/32JF-B5AC].
27.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3603 (discussing the duties of probation officers); see
also Probation and Pretrial Services—Mission, U.S. CTS., https://
www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/probation-and-pretrial-services/probationand-pretrial-services-mission (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (discussing how the
United States Probation and Pretrial Services System, sometimes referred to
as Federal Probation, was formed in 1927 and that its officers are “considered
the ‘eyes and ears’ of the federal courts, [and] investigate and supervise
persons charged with or convicted of federal crimes”) [https://perma.cc/E5VCQBXB].
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D. Defendants
Of course, the sentencing process also involves defendants.
There were 73,109 people sentenced in federal court in 2018. 28
They were convicted of a wide variety of offenses with the most
common being illegal re-entry into the United States. 29 Drug
trafficking and weapons offenses followed, with property crimes
and a combination of sex and violent offenses rounding out the
top five offense types. 30 The majority of those sentenced, ninetytwo percent, were convicted by guilty plea. 31 For those who did
go to trial, the conviction rate was eighty-two percent. 32 Those
who did not admit their wrongdoing, and put the government to
its burden of proof, often faced what is called a “trial penalty” in
the form of a longer prison sentence. 33
28.
See U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL JUDICIAL
BUSINESS
tbl.D-7
(2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_d7_0930.2018.pdf
[hereinafter Table D-7] (providing a data table containing the criminal
defendants terminated by type of disposition during the twelve-month period
from September 30, 2017 until 2018) [https://perma.cc/BD3D-D68Y].
29.
See U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL JUDICIAL
BUSINESS
tbl.D-9
(2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_d9_0930.2018.pdf
(giving a breakdown of the criminal defendants terminated by offense as of
September 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/ACS7-57K6].
30.
See U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL STATISTICAL
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY tbl.D-2 (2018), https://www.uscourts.gov
/statistics/table/d-2/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2018/12/31 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2020) (noting that the top five offense types constituted more than
seventy percent of the cases handled overall) [https://perma.cc/29VX-D6HV].
31.
See Table D-7, supra note 28; see also Michael H. Tonry, Criminal
Law: The Missing Element in Sentencing Reform, 35 VAND. L. REV. 607, 609
n.15 (1982) (discussing how the high conviction rate upon plea of guilty is not
new in federal court, it was eighty-seven percent in 1977).
32.
See U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL STATISTICAL
TABLES
FOR
THE
FEDERAL
JUDICIARY
tbl.D-4
(2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-4/statistical-tables-federaljudiciary/2019/12/31 (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (providing information about
criminal defendants disposed of by U.S. district courts, by type of disposition
and offense) [https://perma.cc/LQ4Y-Q8R9].
33.
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Harsh Sentences Are Killing the Jury
Trial, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national
/archive/2013/12/harsh-sentences-are-killing-the-jury-trial/282121/
(last
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Defendants in the federal system are disproportionately
men and minorities. 34 Women make up only thirteen percent of
defendants overall. 35 Hispanics are more than half the
defendant population while those categorized White and Black
make up twenty-one percent each. 36 Non-U.S. citizens account
for more than forty percent of federal defendants. 37 None of the

visited Jan. 30, 2020) (discussing the findings of the Human Rights Watch
Report: An Offer You Can’t Refuse) [https://perma.cc/Z5UQ-9UM4]; see also
Johnson, supra note 19, at 256 n.4 (citing to additional reports of “97 percent
of defendants who plead guilty receiv[ing] the acceptance of responsibility
discount”); see also An Offer You Can’t Refuse, supra note 19 (describing that
if a defendant refused to plead guilty, prosecutors “sought remarkably long
sentences—at least double the time they would have served had they agreed
to plead”).
34.
See Report to the United Nations on Racial Disparities in the U.S.
Criminal Justice System, THE SENT’G PROJECT (Apr. 19, 2018), https://
www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/ (last
visited Jan. 30, 2020) (submitting a report to the United Nations on
“Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and
Related Intolerance”) [https://perma.cc/2268-4BUE].
35.
See Melissa Hamilton, Some Facts About Life: The Law, Theory, and
Practice of Life Sentences, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 803, 839 (2016) (finding
also that women make up only two percent of federal defendants sentenced to
life in prison).
36.
See Tonry, supra note 31, at 613 (“[F]orty-eight percent of the prison
population in 1979 [was black], compared with thirteen percent of the general
population . . . .”). With the increasing number of Hispanic inmates stemming
from immigration prosecutions, Blacks and Whites have been decreasing as a
percentage of inmates. See 2018 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N ANN. REP. 8, https://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annualreports-and-sourcebooks/2018/2018-Annual-Report.pdf [hereinafter 2018
USSC ANNUAL REPORT] (analyzing approximately 321,000 sentencing-related
documents for 69,425 individual sentencings) [https://perma.cc/BRZ6-VZ2W];
John Gramlich, The Gap Between the Number of Blacks and Whites in Prison
Is Shrinking, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org
/fact-tank/2019/04/30/shrinking-gap-between-number-of-blacks-and-whitesin-prison/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2020) (“The decline in the black-white gap
between 2007 and 2017 was driven by a 20% decrease in the number of black
inmates, which outpaced a 13% decrease in the number of white inmates.”)
[https://perma.cc/U4M7-WHBM].
37.
See 2018 USSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 36 (“Immigration cases
accounted for the largest single group of offenses in fiscal year 2018,
comprising 34.4 percent of all reported cases.”).

TECHNOLOGY’S INFLUENCE ON FEDERAL SENTENCING

577

stated demographics match those for the general population of
the United States. 38
Most defendants have a prior criminal history. 39 A study by
the United States Sentencing Commission found that nearly
three-quarters of federal defendants had at least one prior
conviction. 40 The average number of convictions, among those
who had them, was six. 41 Nearly forty percent of those prior
convictions related to crimes of violence, assault being the most
common, followed by robbery, rape, and homicide. 42
Recidivism rates among defendants once they complete
their federal prison sentence depends on the definition of
recidivism used and length of post-release time analyzed by
researchers. 43 Studies have used one or more of the following as
measures of recidivism: rearrests, rearrests related to felony
charges, reconviction, reconviction on a specific charge (e.g., sex
offense), reimprisonment, and revocation of a community
38.
See United States Demographic Statistics, INFOPLEASE, https://
www.infoplease.com/us/comprehensive-census-data-state/demographicstatistics-342 (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (listing women as fifty-one percent of
the U.S. population, Hispanics as thirteen percent, Whites as seventy-five
percent, and Blacks as twelve percent) [https://perma.cc/2MDS-BY6L]; see also
Population Distribution by Citizenship Status, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., https://
www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-citizenship-status
/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22s
ort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (listing non-U.S. citizens as
seven percent of the overall U.S. population) [https://perma.cc/ZZH6-ALGF].
39.
See, e.g., TRACEY KYCKELHAHN & EMILY HERBST, U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, THE CRIMINAL HISTORY OF FEDERAL OFFENDERS 3 (2018), https://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2018/20180517_criminal-history.pdf (noting that 45,069 of the
61,946 federal offenders included in the study had prior convictions) [https://
perma.cc/473M-NKRX].
40.
See id. (“Almost three-quarters (72.8%) of those offenders had been
convicted of a prior offense.”).
41.
See id. (noting that the median was four prior convictions).
42.
See id. (listing 29.5 percent of convictions were for assault, 8.1 percent
for robbery, 4.4 percent for rape, and 1.9 percent for homicide).
43.
James L. Johnson, Comparison of Recidivism Studies: AOUSC,
USSC, and BJS, 81 FED. PROB. 52, 54 (2017) (“No study is without error, and
any definition will underestimate the ‘true’ recidivism rate, because rates are
based on official criminal record data that only show crimes for which people
have been arrested or convicted.”).
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supervision term following release. 44 Study periods have been
getting longer with advancements in technology allowing for
analysis of larger amounts of data. 45 While study periods used
to typically span one to three years, now some study periods are
closing in on ten years. 46
The Sentencing Commission conducted a study with an
eight-year study period. 47 Almost half of federal offenders
followed were rearrested in that time frame. 48 Of those, thirtytwo percent were reconvicted, and one-quarter returned to
prison. 49 The risk of recidivism found by the Commission was
associated with the nature of the defendant’s prior criminal
record, age at time of release, federal offense type, and education
level. 50 Similar risk factors were found by another study
44.
See id. at 52 (“Most experts agree that rearrests, reconvictions, and
returns to incarceration during a specified period of time are the primary ways
to measure recidivism.”).
45.
See id. at 53 (“Not surprisingly, studies with longer follow-up periods
tend to report higher rates of recidivism.”).
46.
See MARIEL ALPER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ NO. 250975,
2018 UPDATE ON PRISONER RECIDIVISM: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP PERIOD (20052014) 14 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.pdf
(“This study shows how recidivism and desistance measures change when
longer or shorter follow-up periods are used. With these additional data,
designers and users of recidivism and desistance studies have more
information to determine which follow-up period is best for their needs.”)
[https://perma.cc/KDV3-9PLM].
47.
See KIM STEVEN HUNT & ROBERT DUMVILLE, U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS: A COMPREHENSIVE
OVERVIEW 11 (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/research-publications/2016/recidivism_overview.pdf
(“Because the study follow-up period was eight years, and the typical length
of supervision was not more than three years, most offenders completed their
term of supervision, and were no longer on supervision for much of the followup period.”) [https://perma.cc/3YED-458Y].
48.
See id. at 5 (indicating that 49.3 percent were rearrested for violating
supervision conditions or for a completely new offense).
49.
See id. (noting that 31.7 percent of the offenders were reconvicted,
and 24.6 percent were reincarcerated over the eight-year period).
50.
See id. (limiting the results of the study to 25,431 federal offenders
who were living U.S. citizens who re-entered the community during 2005, had
valid FBI numbers, and pre-sentence investigation reports that detailed
sentences that were not vacated).
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conducted by the United States Probation and Pretrial Services
System, with the added elements of cognitions—the defendant’s
thought patterns and value systems—and the prosocial nature
of the defendant’s associates. 51
III. The Past
Following the American Revolution and through the
Nineteenth Century, there were very few federal prosecutions. 52
The penalties for the small number of federal offenses that did
exist were varied—ranging from mandatory death sentences
and fixed corporal punishment such as standing at the pillory to
varying terms of imprisonment that the court could impose at
its discretion. 53 State and local systems at the time did not
exclusively entrust sentencing authority to judges, instead
giving authority in some instances to juries. 54
51.
See Matt DeLisi, Michael J. Elbert & Alan J. Drury, Federal Criminal
Careers: An Empirical Examination of the Post-Conviction Risk Assessment
(PCRA), 43 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 792, 795 (2018) (“[T]he basic components of the
PCRA are compatible with understanding variations in criminal careers,
particularly the most chronic and serious offenders that have been shown to
have extensive criminogenic risks and needs that collectively contribute to
severe responsivity deficits as well.”).
52.
See Jim Martin, The Creation of the Department of Justice, LIBR.
CONG. (Dec. 4, 2017), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2017/12/the-creation-of-thedepartment-of-justice/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020) (“Only a few cases would arise
under the nascent federal criminal law, the most famous of the early
Republican period being the treason trial of Aaron Burr.”) [https://perma.cc
/YD86-E2SK]; see also Jurisdiction: Criminal, FED. JUD. CTR., https://
www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdiction-criminal (last visited Feb. 4, 2020)
(noting that between 1801 and 1829, there were, on average, fewer than one
hundred federal criminal indictments per year, and numbers did not begin
notably increasing until the prosecution of criminal cases following the Civil
War) [https://perma.cc/VPC5-JMSF?type=image].
53.
See, e.g., Crimes Act of 1790 (1st Federal Criminal Law), STATUTES &
STORIES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.statutesandstories.com/blog_html/crimesact-of-1790-1st-federal-criminal-law/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020) (describing the
lawful forms of punishment for capital and other federal crimes) [https://
perma.cc/T74T-CZ67].
54.
See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J.
951, 953 (2003) (stating that only five states—Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma,
Texas, and Virginia—permit juries to make the sentencing decision in
noncapital felony cases).
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A. The Indeterminant Sentencing System
During most of the Twentieth Century, as the number of
federal offenses steadily increased, the federal government used
an “indeterminant” sentencing system. 55 Under that system,
each case was resolved on its own merits; to the extent there
were standards, they evolved from the day-to-day experience
of sentencing individuals. There was little or no appellate
review of sentencing. And the substantive law of sentencing
was shaped by rehabilitation, a penal philosophy that
necessarily reinforced the judge’s role and limited Congress’s
and the public’s. 56

The indeterminant model was being followed in many
states and western countries as well. 57 The emphasis on
rehabilitation was a reflection of the prevailing belief that crime
is a failing of the community more than that of the individual. 58
Another important aspect of the model was that it entrusted
sentencing decisions to professional judges and corrections

55.
See Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975–2025, 42 CRIME &
JUST. 141, 141–42 (2013) (“In 1970, every American state and federal system
since at least the 1930s had operated an indeterminate sentencing system
premised on rehabilitation as the primary aim of punishment and on the
desirability of tailoring sentences in every case to the offender’s circumstances
and needs.”).
56.
See Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too
Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691,
696 (2010) (discussing the greater power that judges and parole authorities
held relative to that of other sentencing players such as Congress or the
public).
57.
See Tonry, supra note 55, at 142 (describing how state and federal
judges followed the indeterminate model of sentencing which was also adopted
by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency’s Advisory Council of
Judges, as well as the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Law in its Proposed Federal Criminal Code).
58.
See Edward C. Kaminski, Indeterminate Sentencing—Half-Step
Toward Science in Law, 10 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 574, 574–75 (1959) (“But a
new school of thought, criminology, had developed the idea that it was not the
criminal who had wronged society, but rather that society had wronged the
criminal by inflicting upon him adverse environmental influences that molded
his criminality.”).
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officials, rejecting reliance on lay juries, 59 who—it was felt—had
little or no experience in sentencing matters. The inclusion of
parole, which was designed to incentivize and act on a
defendant’s rehabilitation, gave the indeterminant model its
name. 60 The contingent and discretionary nature of parole
meant no one knew at original sentencing and for a period
afterward how much time a defendant would serve in prison. 61
The discretion afforded judges and corrections officials also
addressed practical considerations of the day. Technology, or
more accurately its absence, significantly limited operation and
oversight of the indeterminate system, or any system that would
have been used for that matter. Up until the 1980s, office
equipment in the judiciary consisted primarily of the typewriter
and desk telephone. Collaboration among judges, parole
officials, and prison officials was difficult. Development and
dissemination of reference materials was expensive and time
consuming. Research—whether it be legal or social science—
was primarily a manual endeavor, both often costly and difficult
to replicate. Even simply transferring documents, until
photocopiers became commonplace, was a challenge. 62 As a
practical matter, centralizing control of sentencing was
59.
See Gertner, supra note 56, at 694 (explaining how the power of the
jury declined, including the power to affect the sentence).
60.
See Michael Tonry, Reconsidering Indeterminate and Structured
SENT’G
&
CORRECTIONS,
Sept.
1999,
at
5,
Sentencing,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/175722.pdf (describing how indeterminate
sentencing views human beings as malleable and redeemable and,
accordingly, allows maximum scope for efforts to provide services to offenders
and to expose them to opportunities for self-improvement and advancement)
[https://perma.cc/6P2P-LVZM].
61.
See Edward Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence
and Parole System, 16 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 9 (1925) (explaining that
indeterminate sentencing generally means that a maximum limit for the
duration of imprisonment is specified, or if it is not, it is fixed by law and
implicit in the sentence).
62.
See Nick Heath, The Evolution of Office Technology: From the
Typewriter to the Tablet, ZDNET (Oct. 23, 2013, 7:25 AM), https://
www.zdnet.com/pictures/the-evolution-of-office-technology-from-thetypewriter-to-the-tablet/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (stating that the
contribution of modern technology to each worker’s productivity is nearly five
times greater today than it was in the 1970s) [https://perma.cc/2X64-877N].

582

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 565 (2020)

impossible, and accurately studying and reporting on the
system for most of its existence was a challenge as well. “Big
data” did not exist, at least not on the scale it does today. 63
Consequently, for even those within the system, anecdotes had
to pass for reliable data. 64
For judges, parole officials, and prison officials, particularly
those working in remote sections of the country, it meant they
had to work in isolation—almost blind to the activities of their
colleagues. At the time, the greatest resource that could be
dedicated to sentencing was the individual professionalism and
experience of judges and corrections officials.
The strengths of the indeterminate approach included
allowing judges to tailor sentences to the criminogenic risk and
rehabilitative needs of each defendant. 65 Judges also could
leverage use of non-custodial sentencing options, including
suspending sentences, imposing probation, 66 and ordering
financial sanctions. Even if the harsher option of imprisonment
was imposed, the United States Parole Commission could

63.
See ROGER K. WARREN, CRIME & JUSTICE INST., EVIDENCE-BASED
PRACTICE TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE JUDICIARIES, at xi
(2007) (“Most important, unlike 30 years ago, there is today an enormous body
of sophisticated research.”). A Google Search conducted on January 2, 2020,
for the time period 1900 to 1970, for the phase “recidivism study” returned no
hits. In contrast, more than 2,300 hits using the same phrase were returned
for documents created from 1980 to 2020.
64.
See Peter Reuter, Methodological Problems of Organized Crime
Research, in MAJOR ISSUES IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL 169, 173 (Herbert
Edelhertz ed., 1986) (citing a plurality of anecdotes constituting data in the
absence of anything else in relation to organized crime research of the time).
65.
See Douglas A. Berman, Reflecting on Parole’s Abolition in the
Federal Sentencing System, Federal Probation, 81 FED. PROB. J. 18, 18 (2017)
(“[P]revalent modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit
the offender and not merely the crime.” (quoting Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 247 (1949))).
66.
See Probation Act of March 4, 1925, Pub. L. No. 596, 43 Stat. 1259
(providing for the suspension of the sentence and release of the prisoner on
probation after conviction or after a plea of guilty or nolo contender for any
crime or offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment).
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reduce the length of terms if warranted based on the defendant’s
post-sentencing conduct. 67
B. Critiques of the Indeterminant Sentencing System
The problem, according to critics, was that the system
operated in an arbitrary way and did not help defendants, nor
did it protect the community. 68 The imposition of disparate
sentences seemed inevitable. Judges had considerable
discretion and operated independently of one another.
Consequently, they were in silos, and because difficult
sentencing issues can legitimately be approached in different
ways, inconsistencies emerged. 69 The disparity seemed to work
to the particular disadvantage of minorities, with Blacks being
both disproportionately victims of crime and recipients of longer
prison sentences. 70 Compounding things further, as long as the
67.
See Lindsey, supra note 61, at 10 (describing how this concept began
in New York in 1817 by giving prison inspectors power to release inmates who
had served three-fourths of their sentence, as a reward for good behavior).
68.
See Gary L. Mason, Indeterminate Sentencing: Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, or Just Plain Cruel, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 89, 98–100 (1990) (explaining how rehabilitation as it applies
to sentencing is criticized as frivolous when the central problem is to habilitate
felons for the first time, as a majority of them ran into trouble with the law as
teenagers and have never been exposed to a law-abiding, self-supporting life).
69.
See Christopher T. Bayley, Good Intentions Gone Awry—A Proposal
for Fundamental Change in Criminal Sentencing, 51 WASH. L. REV. 529, 535
(1976) (“One study involving the federal courts found significant sentence
disparity among individual judges in the same judicial district as well as
among those in different geographical areas.”); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at
41 (1983) (citing A. PARTRIDGE & W. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE
SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES 1-3 (1974)); see
also Tonry, supra note 31, at 612 (“In several well-known experiments
researchers asked trial judges to review presentence reports and to indicate
the sentences that they would impose. The results demonstrated that for the
same defendant, some judges would impose probation and other judges would
impose a lengthy prison sentence.”).
70.
See JOAN R. PETERSILIA, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, at v–vii (1983) (“Blacks are also
disproportionately victimized by crime: Murder is the leading cause of death
for young black males, and is also high for young black females. . . .
[A]fter . . . a felony conviction, minority offenders were more likely than
whites to be given longer sentences and to be put in prison rather than jail.”).
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judge stayed within the very broad statutory parameters of the
day, the parties were precluded from challenging the sentence
on appeal. 71
The lack of certainty inherent in indeterminant sentencing
presented yet another problem. It diminished the deterrent
effect of sentencing associated with upholding the rule of law.
Defendants walked into the courtroom having no idea what they
would be sentenced to, they walked out not knowing how their
sentence looked relative to other defendants, and not even
knowing how much of the sentence would actually be enforced.
The ambiguity, critics argued, undercut the deterrent value of
the sentencing process. 72
Maybe more fatal to indeterminant sentencing was the fact
that when research did eventually start to build leading into the
1980s, the results were disappointing. 73 In addition to
documenting the sentencing disparity that in the aggregate
could not be explained, studies indicated that the central
objective of the indeterminant system—rehabilitation—was not
being achieved. 74
71.
See Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 889 (2017) (holding that
the “Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to a challenge under the void-forvagueness doctrine” and that sentencing courts have broad discretion “within
the bounds established by Congress”). see also Gertner, supra note 56, at 696
(“There was little or no appellate review of sentencing.”).
72.
LYNNE GOODSTEIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DETERMINATE SENTENCING
AND THE CORRECTIONAL PROCESS: A STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT
OF SENTENCING REFORM IN THREE STATES 12 (1984) (stating that conservative
critics believe that “judicial discretion [in indeterminate sentencing]
undermines the deterrent value of punishment because offenders are never
certain whether they will be punished or, if punished, how severe the
punishment will be.”)
73.
See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (discussing research
and criticism that focused on the success of indeterminate sentencing).
74.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging
Legal Issues in the Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1361, 1366
(1975) (“Support for their charges can be found in a number of carefully
conducted studies revealing frequent examples of unjustified disparity in the
sentences assigned offenders having similar case histories . . . .”); Robert
Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, PUB.
INT., Spring 1974, at 22, 25 (“With few and isolated exceptions, the
rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable
effect on recidivism.”) (emphasis omitted).
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The Bureau of Justice Statistics found, for example, that
sixty-one percent of those admitted to prison in 1979 were
recidivists, and forty-six percent of the recidivists admitted
would have still been in prison on an earlier sentence had they
not been paroled or otherwise released early. 75
While it was unclear if the failure related to the
responsivity of the defendants or the quality of the
programming offered, indeterminate sentencing had not
delivered on its primary objective. 76 With crime rates
climbing, 77 judges being blamed, 78 and even prisons being
criticized as too soft-on-crime, 79 the fate of indeterminate
75.
LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXAMINING
RECIDIVISM
1
(1985),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization
/96501NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8PA-HA2Q]; but see MARIEL ALPER ET
AL., supra note 46, at 1 (analyzing recent recidivism rates on the basis of data
collected from thirty states).
76.
See Mason, supra note 68 (“In fact, just over the last decade, it has
become increasingly clear that the indeterminate sentencing system has fallen
short in reaching its lauded goal: the rehabilitation of convicted felons.”); see
also MARIEL ALPER ET AL., supra note 46, at 1 (“An estimated 68% of released
prisoners were arrested within 3 years, 79% within 6 years, and 83% during
the 9 years.”). Note that it is difficult to compare the criminogenic risk profile
of the 1980s cohort versus the more recent.
77.
See Lauren-Brooke Eisen, America’s Faulty Perception of Crime
Rates,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST.
(Mar.
16,
2015),
https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/americas-faultyperception-crime-rates (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (“Americans who lived
through the 1960s and 1970s remember the fear associated with a real surge
in violent crime. In fact, the violent crime rate increased by 126 percent
between 1960 and 1970 . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/L3HB-JGTB].
78.
See Edward V. Heck, Justice Brennan and the Heyday of Warren
Court Liberalism, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 866 (1980) (“[L]aw enforcement
spokesmen charged that the Justices were soft on crime, pro-criminal, and
anti-police.”); see also GOODSTEIN, supra note 72 (“[C]onservatives
traditionally have been opposed to the discretion inherent in the
indeterminate sentence because of the freedom it provides judges to be ‘soft on
criminals.”).
79.
See Dick Zimmer, Prison Is No Place for ‘Extras,’ THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Feb. 28, 1995), https://www.csmonitor.com/1995/0228/28204.html
(last visited Feb. 9, 2020) (citing state and federal prison facilities with access
to: closed-circuit television stations airing sex, violence, and horror shows;
pool tables; tennis and handball courts; ball fields; miniature golf, and; daily
movies) [https://perma.cc/8CL2-ERPZ].
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sentencing—at least on the federal level—was sealed. The
question then was what would replace it.
IV. The Present
A. The Determinant Sentencing System
The “determinant” sentencing system that came to be,
particularly with passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, 80 was virtually a line-by-line repudiation of the
indeterminant system. 81 The new system sought to bring more
“truth-in-sentencing,” to reduce disparity and to better protect
the community. 82
Whereas the touchstones of the indeterminant system were
rehabilitation and judicial discretion, under determinant
sentencing, incapacitation and deterrence would be prioritized,
along with uniformity. 83 The pendulum shift was nearly
absolute. 84
One key feature of the Sentencing Reform Act was
establishment of the United States Sentencing Commission. 85
Although more known for promulgation of sentencing
guidelines, the Commission’s mission includes collection,
analysis, and sharing of information related to federal crime and
80.
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch.
II, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and
28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2018)).
81.
See William T. Carey, Determinate Sentencing in California and
Illinois: Its Effect on Sentence Disparity and Prisoner Rehabilitation, 1979
WASH. U. L. Q. 551, 557–68 (1979) (discussing the revisions made to the
criminal justice system by the introduction of determinate sentencing
reforms).
82.
See id. at 553–54 (“The definite sentence, on the other hand, generally
has been justified as a means to achieve the goals of deterrence and
retribution.”).
83.
See id. (“Rehabilitation, however, has seldom been practiced
effectively . . . .”).
84.
The new system did restrain some judicial discretion, albeit guided
through an intricate guideline system. So, judges’ discretion was cabined but
not eliminated.
85.
28 U.S.C. § 991 (2018).
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sentencing. 86 The assignment of that mission to the
Commission, in conjunction with complementary missions given
to the Bureau of Justice Statistics 87 and other agencies, reflects
Congress’s commitment to being empirical and viewing
sentencing as an evolutionary process.
B. Research and the Indeterminant Sentencing System
The Commission has published scores of research reports
over the years and continues to make data files available for
others to conduct research. 88 The amount of information
processed and shared by the Commission, and its ability to
develop and implement changes to the guidelines, 89 is only
86.
See 2018 USSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 36, at 2 (identifying the
statutory duties of the federal agency).
87.
See About the Bureau of Justice Statistics, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=abu (last visited Feb. 9, 2020) (“To collect,
analyze, publish, and disseminate information on crime, criminal offenders,
victims of crime, and the operation of justice systems at all levels of
government. These data are critical to federal, state, and local policymakers
in combating crime and ensuring that justice is both efficient and
evenhanded.”) [https://perma.cc/JF23-LZV9?type=image].
88.
See generally Research, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, https://
www.ussc.gov/research (last visited Feb. 9, 2020) (providing reports and data
files) [https://perma.cc/VZ2L-YXXZ]; see also Office of Research and Data, U.S.
SENT’G COMMISSION, https://www.ussc.gov/about/who-we-are/organization
/office-research-and-data (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (“As part of its ongoing
work, the Office of Research and Data studies a wide variety of sentencing
issues, including changes in the types and severity of federal crimes, changes
in the demographic characteristics and criminal history of federal offenders,
and sentencing trends in the federal courts.”) [https://perma.cc/6FZV-JLVM].
89.
Cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N Supp. 2018) (containing amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines
effective November 1, 2012 through November 1, 2018); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, vol. 3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2011) (containing
amendments effective November 1, 2004 through November 1, 2011); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, vol. 2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2003) (containing amendments effective November 1, 1998 through November
1, 2003); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, vol. 1 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2003) (containing amendments effective through
November 1, 1997). Since the effective date of the original guideline manual
on November 1, 1987, there have been 813 amendments for an average of 27
a year.
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possible because of the technologies that began to mature in the
1980s. 90
Desktop computers, word processing and spreadsheet
software, facsimiles, email, laser printers, and electronic
scanning, all facilitated data research and reporting. Awareness
of sentencing trends and understanding of new policies and
procedures of the Commission is now achieved at a pace that
was unknown in the indeterminate era.
C. The Push for “Truth in Sentencing”
The determinant system sought to achieve “truth in
sentencing” through a number of mechanisms. On the back end,
parole was abolished. 91 As a result, defendants serve whatever
prison term is imposed, less relatively minor reductions for good
behavior. 92
On the front end, the Sentencing Reform Act and other
statutes served to limit judges’ discretion. 93 Judges had to
record and report more of their sentencing activities; sentencing
overall was subjected to more appellate review. 94 Congress
enacted a series of laws requiring mandatory minimum prison
terms. 95
90.
See David Bradlow, The Changing Legal Environment—The 1980s
and Beyond, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at 72, 74 (discussing the impact that
automation will have on the legal industry).
91.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a) (2018) (“A prisoner shall be released by the
Bureau of Prisons on the date of the expiration of the prisoner’s term of
imprisonment . . . .”).
92.
See id. § 3624(b) (stating the terms by which a prisoner may receive
credit toward an effectively reduced sentence).
93.
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363–68 (1989)
(contrasting the level of judicial discretion under indeterminate sentencing
against the level of discretion after the Sentencing Reform Act).
94.
See id. at 367–68 (describing the scope of appellate review under the
Sentencing Reform Act).
95.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7–
23 (2011), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressionaltestimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf
/Chapter_02.pdf [hereinafter 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS] (describing the
history of mandatory minimum sentences) [https://perma.cc/D9JG-W96Q].
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While not a new concept, 96 mandatory minimum penalties
had fallen out of favor during the indeterminant sentencing
era. 97 Mandatory minimums serve to limit judicial discretion
and arguably limit disparity. 98 The mandatory minimums
created in the 1980s were particularly significant because they
applied to a large and growing portion of the criminal docket:
drug and weapons offenses. 99 The new penalties were
particularly severe for crack cocaine distribution, as Congress
deemed that substance extraordinarily addictive and associated
with violence. 100
Later, mandatory minimum terms were added for child
abuse, child pornography, and identity theft offenses—all to
reflect the seriousness with which Congress viewed those
offenses. 101 The severity of the penalties for crack cocaine were
eventually reduced by Congress in 2010 and a “safety valve” was
created from mandatory minimums involving low-ranking drug
offenders. 102
96.
See id. (discussing mandatory minimum sentencing before the
Sentencing Reform Act).
97.
See id. at 18 (“In 1897, Congress created the Commission to Revise
and Codify the Criminal and Penal Laws of the United States . . . in its reports
to Congress, the Revision Commission recommended the abolition of
mandatory minimum penalties for many crimes not punishable by death.”).
98.
See id. at 1 (describing the goals of sentencing reform).
99.
See, e.g., Juvenile Drug Trafficking Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570,
100 Stat. 3207 (outlining mandatory minimum sentencing for the employing
minors in the illegal drug trade).
100.
See 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 95, at 24–25
(discussing the one-to-one hundred ratio treatment of crack and cocaine
whereby sentencing for crack offenses are one-hundred times harsher than for
the same offense with powder cocaine); see also The Relationship Between
Cocaine Use and Violence, LIFE WORKS (Feb. 1, 2020), https://
www.lifeworkscommunity.com/blog/the-relationship-between-cocaine-abuseand-violence (last visited Feb. 23, 2020) (“26% of crack users had committed a
crime while on crack, 95% of which involved violence.”) [https://perma.cc
/C84N-KKMN].
101.
See 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 95, at 27–29
(discussing the addition of mandatory minimum sentencing in both the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 and the Identity Theft Penalty
Enhancement Act).
102.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2018) (specifying the conditions on which
offenders may receive lower penalties than the statutory minimum).
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D. The Introduction of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Another key component to truth-in-sentencing was the
sentencing guidelines. The guidelines were formed,
implemented, and continue to be monitored by the United
States Sentencing Commission. 103 The Commission was
directed by Congress to create guidelines that address twelve
factors in all, including just punishment, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 104 Along with certainty and
fairness, the Commission was charged with avoiding
unwarranted disparity and relatedly was to limit the impact of
defendants’ personal characteristics at sentencing. 105 If that
were not enough, the Commission had to allow for judges to
depart from the prescribed sentence based on relevant
aggravating and mitigating factors. 106
The Commission attempted to balance all the complex,
sometimes competing, factors in its charge, but out of necessity
had to make trade-offs and value judgments. 107 Discretion had
to rest somewhere and by entrusting it to one entity, the
Sentencing Commission, it was hoped that federal sentencing
would become more consistent.

103.
See About, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION (Feb. 1, 2020), https://
www.ussc.gov/about-page (last visited Feb. 23, 2020) (providing an overview
of the Sentencing Commission’s role in creating and maintaining federal
sentencing guidelines) [https://perma.cc/MX24-FTJX].
104.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1–2 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018) (describing the statutory mission of the Sentencing Reform Act)
[https://perma.cc/SZ35-487X].
105.
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (describing the duties of the commission).
106.
See Chris Eskridge, An Overview of the United States Sentencing
Commission, UNIV. OF NEB. (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.unl.edu/eskridge
/cj211sentence.html (describing the primary purposes for sentencing
guidelines) [https://perma.cc/4M58-MFKL].
107.
See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8–24 (1988)
(explaining various compromises, including the Commission’s incorporation of
the Parole Commission’s framework for offender characteristics due to a lack
of consensus on what new characteristics to include).
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The Commission created a point system that correlated to
a range of prison time, and other components of a sentence. 108
Values, or levels, were created for such things as harm in the
case, role in the offense, attempts at obstruction of justice, and
acceptance of responsibility. 109 Points and categories were
created to capture the severity of the defendant’s prior criminal
record. 110 Then, the offense level and criminal history points
were applied to a grid that produced a guideline custody range,
in months. 111 Consequently, defendants with comparable
criminal histories and similar federal offense conduct would
have the same or similar guideline range, effectively reducing
disparity. Courts could “depart” from the prescribed guideline
range, but through processes set out in the guidelines
themselves. 112
As added protections and to facilitate study, judges were
required to explain the reasons for the sentence imposed both
on the record in court and in various forms required by the
Sentencing Commission. 113 Another major difference from the
108.
See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (providing how points are allocated based on
various circumstances).
109.
See id. at 345–79 (describing sentencing adjustments based on
awarding of different points).
110.
See id. at 379–405 (providing the sentencing effects of criminal
history and livelihood).
111.
See generally id.
112.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.33 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 ANNUAL
REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK]. In 2018, courts departed in about half the cases. Of
those, about forty percent of the departures were upon motion of the
government for the defendant’s cooperation. Only about one percent of cases
involved an “upward departure” where the court impose a sentence above the
guideline custody range. The rest all represented downward departures.
113.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2018) (requiring the courts to include a
statement of reasoning for the sentence imposed); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)
(2018) (requiring courts to submit a sentencing report to the Commission);
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY: ROLE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS 7–8 (2017) (explaining that reporting requirements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) saved on costs because it removed the need
for obtaining and reviewing long sentencing transcripts to determine the
reasoning).

592

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 565 (2020)

indeterminant sentencing system was the scope of appellate
review. 114 Automatic rights to appeal were created if a judge
sentenced outside the applicable guideline range, defendants
being able to challenge any sentence above the range while the
government was authorized to appeal any sentence below the
guidelines. 115
On November 1, 1987, the guidelines went into effect. 116 As
would be expected in light of the seismic change they
represented, criticism followed and has not stopped. The nature
of the criticism varies with the perspective and position of the
proponent. 117 However, one themed complaint is that the
guidelines are overly complicated. The guideline manual itself
is hundreds of pages and has been amended more than 800
times. 118

114.
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 368 (1989) (describing
the scope of appellate review under the Sentencing Reform Act).
115.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 7 (2004),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/15-yearstudy/15_year_study_full.pdf (explaining the automatic right to appeal under
18 U.S.C. § 3742) [https://perma.cc/4XGP-CTZD]; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a),
(b) (2018) (describing the range-related conditions under which the defendant
and the government may file for appeal, respectively); Ellsworth A. Van
Graafeiland, Some Thoughts on the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 31 VILL. L.
REV. 1291, 1293–94 (1986) (discussing Congress’s intent to distinguish
between those appeals based on incorrect application of the guidelines and
those appeals based sentencing beyond the applicable ranges under the
guidelines).
116.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018) (“The following provisions of this Subpart set forth the original
introduction to this manual, effective November 1, 1987 . . . .”).
117.
See Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing
Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 37, 62 (2005) (explaining different attitudes toward
the guidelines by individuals with varying goals).
118.
See Jon O. Newman, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Good Idea
Badly Implemented, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 805, 811 (2017) (stating that the
Guidelines Manual is more than 500 pages and has had more than 800
amendments added).
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E. The Supreme Court and the Guidelines
There is also a body of interpretive caselaw with circuit
splits and Supreme Court opinions on important issues. 119 Also,
judges have to complete regimented forms to facilitate recording
of the sentence and its reasons in Sentencing Commission
databases. 120 Some argue the forms are so structured and
bureaucratic that they provide less information, and are less
accessible, than if judges relied on traditional written opinions
which they use in virtually every other aspect of law. 121
In 2005, eighteen years after the guidelines went into effect,
the Supreme Court determined that for the guidelines to be
constitutional they must be advisory and nonbinding on
sentencing judges. 122 The Court’s decision gave a measure of
sentencing discretion back to judges. The Court also brought
jury involvement in sentencing back via a series of Sixth
Amendment cases. 123

119.
See Douglas A. Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law?
Exploring the Risk of Disparity from Differences in Defense Counsel Under
Guidelines Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. REV. 435, 442–43 (2002) (“[J]udicial
decisions soon began to increase significantly the corpus of federal sentencing
law . . . .”).
120.
See Van Graafeiland, supra note 115, at 1295 (“Because the trial court
always must state the reasons for the sentence it has imposed . . . a completely
new body of sentencing law is almost certain to result.”).
121.
See Brian Jacobs, The Vanishing of Federal Sentencing Decisions,
FORBES (July 19, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2019/07/19/thevanishing-of-federal-sentencing-decisions/#2ba2b1344c44 (last visited Apr.
11, 2020) (describing how difficult it is to find sentencing decisions on PACER
and how this disadvantages prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and
defendants) [https://perma.cc/2D8W-VGVF].
122.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (“We answer
the question of remedy by finding the provision of the federal sentencing
statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory, incompatible with today’s
constitutional holding.”).
123.
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“[I]t is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of
facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 252–53 (1999))); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002)
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One would think the Supreme Court holdings would have
turned sentencing practices on their head. The actual impact
was more muted. Since most defendants, as part of plea
agreements, 124 waive their right to jury determinations, 125 jury
influence at sentencing has remained limited. Moreover, while
not binding, judges are still required to consult the sentencing
guidelines. 126 Consequently, guidelines continue to hold a
central place in the sentencing process and custody terms
prescribed by the guidelines remain highly influential. 127
(holding that the aggravating circumstances triggering the death penalty
must be found, per the Sixth Amendment by a jury, not a judge).
124.
See Alan Ellis & Karen. L. Landau, A Federal Criminal Appeal
Primer: A Guide for Clients and their Family and Friends, ALANELLIS (2002),
https://alanellis.com/a-federal-criminal-appeal-primer-a-guide-for-clientsand-their-family-and-friends/ (“While every criminal defendant has a right to
an appeal, the right to appeal may be waived. Many government attorneys
insist upon a waiver of the right to appeal pursuant to a plea agreement under
which the defendant pleads guilty in exchange for some promises or
concessions from the government.”) [https://perma.cc/AQ5B-XCFP]; see also
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 626.2 (2019), https://
www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-626-plea-agreements-andsentencing-appeal-waivers-discussion-law (last updated Jan. 22, 2020) (last
visited Mar. 3, 2020)
The defendant is aware that 18 U.S.C. § 3742 affords a defendant
the right to appeal the sentence imposed. Acknowledging all this,
the defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal any sentence
within the maximum provided in the statute(s) of conviction (or the
manner in which that sentence was determined) on the grounds set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3742 or on any ground whatever, in exchange
for the concessions made by the United States in this plea
agreement. The defendant also waives his right to challenge his
sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any collateral
attack, including but not limited to a motion brought under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.
[https://perma.cc/4UF9-SRVA].
125.
See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s
Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
931, 1029 (1983) (“Indeed, the agreement to waive a jury was occasionally the
product of express bargaining.”).
126.
See United States v. Booker, 43 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (“The district
courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines
and take them into account when sentencing.”).
127.
See Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing after Booker, 48 CRIME & JUST.
137, 137 (2019) (“Booker empowered judges to reject unsound
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F. Concerns with the Guidelines
One substantive concern is that the guidelines seek to
impose prison more often, and for longer periods, than many
believe necessary. 128 When the guidelines went into effect, there
were 49,378 persons in federal prison. 129 Now, more than thirty
years later, the number is 175,248, an increase of 255 percent. 130
Three factors have contributed to that increase:
more
defendants being charged, more of those defendants sentenced
to prison, and defendants staying in custody longer.
In 1986, 50,334 defendants were charged with crimes in
federal court. 131 That number reached 86,950 in 2018. 132
Whereas forty-eight percent of defendants in 1986 received
noncustodial sentences, 133 now less than ten percent avoid
guidelines. Booker has had, however, surprisingly little effect on sentence
severity or imprisonment use. Sentencing below guideline ranges increased,
but more from a general relaxation of guidelines’ restrictions than from
reasoned rejection of unsound guidelines. They continue to exert gravitational
pull.”).
128.
See Lynn S. Adelman, The Tough-on-Crime law Democrats are
Overlooking, WASH. POST (June 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/2019/06/30/theres-another-tough-on-crime-law-democrats-shouldfocus-their-criticism/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2020) (“The commission established
harsh sentencing guidelines and barred judges from putting defendants on
probation except in rare instances. Over the next 20 years, the commission
regularly amended the guidelines, making them even more severe. The
average federal sentence increased from 28 to 50 months . . . .”) [https://
perma.cc/QJ29-MHJF].
129.
Population Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov
/about/statistics/population_statistics.jsp (last updated Apr. 16, 2020) (last
visited Apr. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/NXT5-3H6F].
130.
See id. (showing that the number of inmates has declined twenty
percent from a reported high of 219,298 in 2013).
131.
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Compendium of
Federal Justice Statistics 9, tbl. 1.2 (1986).
132.
See U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL JUDICIAL
BUSINESS
tbl.D-2
(2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-2
/judicial-business/2018/09/30 (last visited Apr. 11, 2020) (detailing the number
of criminal defendants charged from September 30, 2014 to September 30,
2018) [https://perma.cc/W4H7-DCBC].
133.
See Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth E. Carlson, Federal Sentencing
in Transition, 1986−90, FED. JUST. STAT., at 2 (1992), https://www.bjs.gov
/content/pub/pdf/fst8690.pdf (“Although this growth in the number of
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imprisonment. 134 And with the length of custody terms imposed
under current practices, and parole no longer being available,
the average custody term served increased from twenty-one to
forty-seven months within ten years of the guidelines’
inception. 135 It should be noted that the trend may be due, in
addition to sentencing policies, to the federal government
targeting more dangerous, higher profile offenders for
prosecution. 136
As to direct costs for the greater reliance on imprisonment,
the annualized average cost per person imprisoned is
$37,449. 137 Some have suggested that it would be cheaper to
send inmates to college. 138 The BOP’s total appropriation now
convictions had slowed from the 6.4% average annual rate for the period of
1980 to 1985, the likelihood of being sentenced to incarceration rose, from 52%
in 1986 to 60% in 1990.”) [https://perma.cc/SE8R-GCR8].
134.
See 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK, supra note 112, at 61
(listing the percentages of sentencing types for federal offenders).
135.
See William J. Sabol & John McGready, Time Served in Prison by
Federal Offenders, 1986-97, FED. JUST. STAT., at 2 (June 1999), https://
static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/bjs/tspfo97.pdf (“Between 1986—the year before
implementation of the Sentencing Reform Act—and 1997, imposed prison
terms increased from 39 months to 54 months. . . . [O]ffenders entering
Federal prison could expect to serve increased from about 21 months, on
average, during 1986 to about 47 months during 1997 . . . .”) [https://perma.cc
/4GQQ-NXDA].
136.
See New Smart on Crime Data Reveals Federal Prosecutors Are
Focused on More Significant Drug Cases and Fewer Mandatory Minimums for
Drug Defendants, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov
/opa/pr/new-smart-crime-data-reveals-federal-prosecutors-are-focused-moresignificant-drug-cases-and (last visited Apr. 11, 2020)
Federal prosecutors are consistently using their discretion to focus
our federal resources on the most serious cases and to ensure that
we reserve harsh mandatory minimum sentence for the most
dangerous offenders. By ensuring fair and proportional sentencing,
these policies engender greater trust in our criminal justice system,
save federal resources and make our communities more safe.
[https://perma.cc/N62C-ZA6N].
137.
See Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration Fee
(COIF), 84 Fed. Reg. 63891, 63891–92 (Nov. 19, 2010) (noting that the cost of
incarceration fee was $37,499 for federal inmates in Bureau facilities).
138.
See Scott Jaschik, Price of a Year in Jail vs. a Year at Harvard, INSIDE
HIGHER ED. (June 5, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017
/06/05/price-year-jail-vs-year-harvard (last visited Mar. 3, 2020) (observing
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exceeds $7 billion a year, increasing from $330 million to $7.5
billion between 1980 and 2016. 139
The indirect costs of imprisonment terms are just as real
but harder to quantify. The indirect costs include lost wages for,
and taxes from, the incarcerated person, financial, and
emotional hardship on defendants’ families, and destabilized
communities. Some put the complete cost of imprisonment in
the United States, direct and indirect costs, at close to one
trillion dollars a year. 140
Whether guideline-prescribed custody terms are sufficient
or excessive is a subjective determination. However, surveys of
jurors do indicate that they would impose less prison time than
do the guidelines. 141 Also, judges, even when they have the
authority to do so, seldom depart upwardly from guideline

that the state of California’s projection for the cost of jail per inmate amounts
to $2,000 more than the price of a year’s tuition at Harvard University)
[https://perma.cc/WJ7P-JTET]. It should be noted the incarceration costs cited
in the article are more than those reported by the BOP.
139.
See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL
PRISON POPULATION BUILDUP: OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 2 (2016) (“The
burgeoning prison population has contributed to mounting operational
expenditures for the federal prison system. BOP’s appropriations increased
more than $7.1 billion from FY1980 ($330 million) to FY2016 ($7.479
billion).”).
140.
See Michael McLaughlin et al., The Economic Burden of Incarceration
in the U.S. 20 (Instit. for Advancing Justice Res. and Innovation, Working
Paper No. AJI072016, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/iajre/the
_economic_burden_of_incarceration_in_the_us.pdf (finding the “aggregate
burden of incarceration” to be $1.014 per year) [https://perma.cc/ZA7FMZDG].
141.
See James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 173, 175 (2010) (“Combining all of the cases, the median juror
recommended sentence was only 19% of the median Guidelines ranges and
only 36% of the bottom of the Guidelines ranges.”).
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ranges. 142 When they do depart, it tends to be downward,
imposing less prison time than the guidelines suggest. 143
Also relevant to the appropriateness of prison terms is the
question of how much community protection is afforded by
confining a given defendant. Some argue imprisonment has
little or no impact on crime rates. 144 In contrast, others have
found that incarceration rates have a sizable, albeit not
exclusive, impact on crime. 145 It is a complicated question with
no shortage of theories. 146
From an intuitive perspective, there seems to be some
causal connection between the prison buildup and crime decline.
The benefit of the reduction in crime cannot be overstated. The
demoralizing effects of crime leading up to the 1980s reforms
permeated everyday existence. 147 Adding to the threat was
142.
Cf. id. at 181 (noting that sentencing judges have discretion to depart
from the guidelines but the guidelines “explicitly disfavor judges’
consideration of factors that speak directly to rehabilitation or deterrence,
thereby prioritizing retribution”).
143.
See 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK, supra note 112, tbl.34
(showing the 68.1 percent of the sentences imposed in FY2018 were either at
the guideline minimum or lower half of the guideline range).
144.
See Study Finds Increased Incarceration Has Marginal-to-Zero
Impact on Crime, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Aug. 7, 2017), https://eji.org/news
/study-finds-increased-incarceration-does-not-reduce-crime/ (last visited Feb.
23, 2020) (“More incarceration will not make us safer, a new report by the Vera
Institute of Justice concludes, because increased incarceration rates have no
demonstrated effect on violent crime and in some instances may increase
crime.”) [https://perma.cc/7DL9-SRLB].
145.
See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the
1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 163, 178 (2004) (“The evidence linking increased punishment to lower
crime rates is very strong.”); Gary Lafree, Explaining the Crime Bust of the
1990s, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 269, 278 (2000) (“So, without the huge
investments in prison beds, the violent crime rate would not have dropped as
far or as fast as it has.”).
146.
See, e.g., Dara Lind & German Lopez, 16 Theories for Why Crime
Plummeted in the US, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2015/2/13/8032231/crimedrop (last updated May 20, 2015, 3:43 PM) (last visited Mar. 3, 2020)
(providing of overview of “16 popular theories for the plummeting crime rate”)
[https://perma.cc/78AF-PXNW].
147.
A visiting artist’s observations of the author’s native New York City
in 1977 included people walking the street in plastic bags, a rising crime rate,
rats, bed bugs, and the town being a mess, in tatters. Keith Richards, Mick
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organized crime, including LaCostra Nostra. 148 More punitive
sentencing provisions contributed to organized crime figures
cooperating with the government, greatly diminishing systemic
crime. 149 The end result is that there are thousands of people
alive today that, statistically speaking, would not be if crime
rates had not changed. The savings in human misery and to
taxpayers have been immense. 150
Since the Booker 151 decision interpreting the guidelines as
advisory, concerns have increased that sentencing disparity,
particularly along racial lines, has grown. 152 Even before
Booker, however, there were concerns that statutory minimums
and the guidelines created their own disparity. 153 In response,
Jagger (the Rolling Stones), Shattered, Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC.
1978. See THE ROLLING STONES, Shattered, on SOME GIRLS, (Rolling Stones
Records 1978).
148.
See generally Ronald J. Ostow, The Mob Against the Ropes:
Prosecutors Using New Laws Are Cracking Omerta—the Code of Silence—to
Jail Hoodlums. The Mafia is Still an Ominous Criminal Force, but Has Lost
Much Power, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 1991), https://www.latimes.com/archives/laxpm-1991-02-09-mn-658-story.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/K99U-6F6H].
149.
See id. (describing the effects of the Mafia stronghold across the
United States and efforts by law enforcement to break up the Mafia).
150.
See Kathryn E. McCollister, Michael T. French, Hai Feng, The Cost
of Crime to Society: New Crime-Specific Estimates for Policy and Program
Evaluation, 108 Drug and Alcohol Dependence 98, 100 (2010) (outlining
limitations that are common in studies attempting to assign monetary values
to the societal costs of crimes).
151.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (declaring that
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as modified by the Court’s constitutional
holding, “makes the [Federal Sentencing] Guidelines effectively advisory”).
152.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN
SENTENCING: AN UPDATE TO THE 2012 BOOKER REPORT 2 (2017) (stating that
Black male offenders receive longer sentences than similarly situated White
male offenders); see also Starr, supra note 9, at 1321 (outlining how Black men
receive disproportionately longer prison sentences than White male
defendants); see also Hartley supra note 9, at 46 (attributing some of the
criticized sentencing disparity to extra-judicial factors, such as application of
statutory minimums, prosecutorial charging, and evidentiary decisions).
153.
See Albert Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical
Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 85 (2005) (“[T]he
Federal Sentencing Guidelines have failed to reduce disparity and probably
have increased it.”); see also Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU
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some dispute the data related to disparity. 154 Others argue that
disparity is not insidious and should be expected in a system
with unique offenses and unique individuals. 155 Yet other
observers argue the focus should be on the propriety of
individual sentences and that clarity is lost in the aggregate. 156
Moreover, “standardization of unjust sentences does not make
them any more just.” 157
So, concerns remain, some based on opinion, others on fact.
The determinant system has brought greater transparency to
sentencing, and the research function of the United States
Sentencing Commission creates a strong foundation for
continued learning. 158 But how to address fears that the regime
is too harsh, too complicated, too costly, and possibly biased?
The answer, again, lies in technologies available now that were
not available when the reforms of the 1980s were
implemented. 159

Says Mandatory Minimums Are Discriminatory and Urges Inter-Am. Comm’n
to Condemn Unfair Practice (Mar. 3, 2006) (“Mandatory minimum sentences
create a system that undermines our notion of justice.”).
154.
Patrick A. Langan, No Racism in the Justice System, 117 THE PUB.
INT. 48, 48 (1994) (“Racial bias studies never completely take into account all
of the legitimate factors that determine how a case is handled.”).
155.
See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong With
Sentencing Equality?, 102 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1451 (2016) (arguing that the
language of equality and disparity obscures the more positive ways one can
understand sentencing differences).
156.
See id. (“[I]n many other areas of law and policy, variation is
considered neutral or even a positive good.”).
157.
E-mail from George V. Doerrbecker, Retired Deputy Chief U.S. Prob.
Officer, to author (Jan. 7, 2020) (on file with author).
158.
See Carey supra note 81, at 568–69 (describing how California and
Illinois have taken “steps to eliminate sentencing disparity and to provide
uniformity of sentencing” by switching to a determinant system).
159.
See Marius J.A. Duker & Arno R. Lodder, Sentencing and Information
Management: Consistency and the Particularities of a Case, 1999 INT’L CONF.
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 100, 100 (“The use of IT and AI to support
sentencing decisions in order to make them more consistent, deserves a lot of
attention nowadays.”).
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V. The Future
There are two areas ripe for improvement in sentencing.
First is the sentence itself. As discussed previously, there is
persistent criticism of sentences being unfair and ineffective. 160
Being able to resolve those criticisms would be a significant
accomplishment that has eluded the federal criminal justice
system. 161 Another area for improvement is “the how.” Making
the process faster and giving people the right kinds of
information, exactly when and how they need it, would improve
the sentencing experience even without changing the sentence
itself. 162
A. Artificial Intelligence
There are a series of technologies, collectively referred to as
Artificial Intelligence (AI), that can help in both areas of
interest. 163 AI mimics how humans think and learn. 164 It is
particularly good at integrating, analyzing, and applying large
amounts of data. 165 Generally, AI brings more consistency to
160.
See Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 153
(criticizing current sentencing practices as undermining justice).
161.
See id. (stressing that judges should be afforded discretion to avoid
unfair outcomes).
162.
See Duker & Lodder supra note 159, at 100 (“[I]nformation
management and electronic versions of case files could help in providing
especially the judge with more relevant information.”).
163.
See Virginia Dignum, What We Talk About When We Talk About
Artificial Intelligence, MEDIUM (July 23, 2018), https://medium.com
/@virginiadignum/what-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-artificialintelligence-13423a294160 (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (providing a brief
introduction to the subject of artificial intelligence) [https://perma.cc/4NLRMDTU?type=image].
164.
See id. (“[T]he ultimate goal of AI is to develop computer systems that
are able to simulate human-like intelligence.”); see generally TOM MARKIEWICZ
& JOSH ZHENG, GETTING STARTED WITH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO BUILDING ENTERPRISE APPLICATIONS (Nicole Tache ed., 2017)
(providing an in-depth discussion of artificial intelligence).
165.
See How Actual Intelligence is Transforming Artificial Intelligence
(AI), FOCUS INV. BANKING (Mar. 26, 2018), https://focusbankers.com/actualintelligence-transforming-artificial-intelligence-ai/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2020)
(highlighting the potential utility artificial intelligence could have for
business) [https://perma.cc/7Q2W-BKD2].
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tasks than do humans. 166 Its logic can be made more
transparent and easier to adjust than human thinking. 167 In
fact, it offers “far greater clarity and transparency about the
ingredients and motivations of decisions, and hence far greater
opportunity to ferret out discrimination,” a major concern in
sentencing. 168
The utility of AI is only increasing with the growth in “big
data.” 169 It contributes more than a trillion dollars a year to the
economy. 170 It already “improves how we diagnose and treat
illnesses, grow our food, manufacture and deliver new products,
manage our finances, power our homes, and traverse our
roads.” 171 It is used in criminal justice to, among other things, 172
deter and detect the crime of credit-card fraud. Companies like
PayPal use the technology to screen millions of transactions at
a time with search parameters shaped by what was learned
from previous investigations and the experience of industry and
166.
See id. (describing the myriad potential uses AI offers in various
industries).
167.
See Jon Kleinberg et al., Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 163 (2018) (arguing that algorithmic logic can be more
easily understood than human thinking).
168.
See id. (arguing that this transparency is a “massive opportunity” for
those who wish to reduce discriminatory behavior).
169.
See Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2012, at 11
(“There is a lot more data, all the time, growing at fifty percent a year . . . .
Data is not only becoming more available but also more understandable to
computers. At the forefront are the rapidly advancing techniques of artificial
intelligence.”).
170.
See Press Release, Gartner Inc., Gartner Says Global Artificial
Intelligence Business Value to Reach $1.2 Trillion in 2018 (Apr. 25, 2018)
(“Global business value derived from artificial intelligence (AI) is projected to
total $1.2 trillion in 2018, an increase of seventy percent from 2017, according
to Gartner, Inc. AI-derived business value is forecast to reach $3.9 trillion in
2022.”).
171.
Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, White House Hosts Summit on Artificial
Intelligence for American Industry, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (May 10, 2018), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/articles/white-house-hosts-summit-artificialintelligence-american-industry/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc
/CD8G-2PAN].
172.
See Duker & Lodder, supra note 159, at 106 (“Because of his position
we believe the judge needs to be supplied with more and better structured
information instead of offering him standardized applications.”).
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law enforcement experts. 173 Visa estimates that its own AIbased fraud-detection system has saved $25 billion. 174 AI
technology is only expected to become more ubiquitous. 175 In
2019, nearly thirty percent of businesses were already using AI
and most executives expected that AI would transform their
company within three years. 176
AI does come with challenges, however. Often AI is
misunderstood. Because of its technical nature and the
proliferation of technojargon, 177 many people rely on the
Hollywood portrayal of AI. That portrayal tends to be one of an
omniscient cyber-entity that alternates between trying to save

173.
See Christopher Rigano, Using Artificial Intelligence to Address
Criminal Justice Needs, 280 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 37, 38 (2019) (“Internet
companies like PayPal stay ahead of fraud attempts by using volumes of data
to continuously train their fraud detection algorithms to predict and recognize
anomalous patterns and to learn to recognize new patterns.”).
174.
See Press Release, Visa Inc., Visa Prevents Approximately $25 Billion
in Fraud Using Artificial Intelligence (June 17, 2019) (describing Visa’s
“neural networks” modeled after the human brain to power AI and identify
possible fraud).
175.
See Maggie Panos, Here’s the Deal With Vision, the Avenger You May
Have Forgotten About, POPSUGAR (May 6, 2016), https://www.popsugar.com
/entertainment/Who-Vision-From-Avengers-37369833 (last visited Feb. 3,
2020) (describing Ultron, “an advanced, intangible network of artificial
intelligence with a desire to wipe out the human race”) [https://perma.cc/9K49LS7U]; see also Prajakta Hebbar, Marvel Comics Visionary Stan Lee Imagined
A World Full of Possibilities, Including an AI Sidekick, ANALYTICS INDIA MAG.
(Nov. 13, 2018), https://analyticsindiamag.com/marvel-visionary-stan-leeimagined-ai-sidekick-jarvis/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (outlining the role
J.A.R.V.I.S., Iron Man’s AI sidekick, played in the Marvel Cinematic Universe)
[https://perma.cc/FQK4-TXY8].
176.
See Gil Press, 9 Indicators of the State of Artificial Intelligence (AI),
FORBES (June 9, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2019/06/09/9indicators-of-the-state-of-artificial-intelligence-ai-may-2019/#705cb814577f
(last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (providing statistics on business leaders’ perception
of the state of AI) [https://perma.cc/Q8UU-4MN6].
177.
See Bernard Marr, The Key Definitions of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
That Explain Its Importance, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/bernardmarr/2018/02/14/the-key-definitions-of-artificial-intelligence-aithat-explain-its-importance/#443f8ea84f5d (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (noting
that the definition of AI seems to vary depending on the entity providing the
definition) [https://perma.cc/EY6K-VVGK].
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and kill humans. 178 The reality is quite different. There are
practical and capacity limits to what AI can do. 179 In addition,
we have the ability—and the obligation—to limit AI based on
ethical, legal, and economic considerations. 180
As to AI’s intentions, its goals are our goals. We code it, we
task it, and we point it to the data it will use. 181 The subjugated
nature of AI to human use and control has researchers
suggesting that it be more accurately called “Augmented
Intelligence,” meaning that it enhances—not replaces—human
interests and abilities. 182 One example of the supportive, rather
than directive, role of AI is the use of spelling and grammar
check now common in word processing applications. The
technology does not determine what is written, rather it makes

178.
See Rachel Boey, An Examination of Artificial Intelligence’s Portrayal
in Avengers: Age of Ultron, DIGITAL PATMOS (Nov. 22, 2017), https://
digitalpatmos.com/vol1issue1/2017/11/22/rachel/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2020)
(discussing the portrayal of AI in Avengers: Age of Ultron) [https://perma.cc
/WVZ8-UH5N].
179.
See Margaret Rouse, Artificial Intelligence, TECHTARGET, https://
searchenterpriseai.techtarget.com/definition/AI-Artificial-Intelligence
(last
updated Apr. 2020) (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“The concept of the Singularity
and a world where the application of superintelligence to humans or human
problems—including poverty, disease and mortality—still falls within the
realm of science fiction.”) [https://perma.cc/KUH7-MQ4F].
180.
See Eduardo Magrani, New Perspectives on Ethics and the Laws of
Artificial Intelligence, 8 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 5–14 (2019) (“Also, the more
adaptable the artificial intelligence programmes become, the more
unpredictable are their actions, bringing new-perspectives-ethics- risks. This
makes it necessary for developers of this type of programme to be more aware
of the ethical and-laws-artificial-intelligence legal responsibilities involved in
this activity.”).
181.
See Rouse, supra note 179 (providing an overview for the development
of AI, its various uses, and the challenges it poses).
182.
See id. (“Some researchers and marketers hope the label augmented
intelligence, which has a more neutral connotation, will help people
understand that most implementations of AI will be weak and simply improve
products and services.”).
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suggestions designed to improve our writing. 183 We decide
whether to accept those suggestions. 184
AI, like humans, can learn from its experiences and
outcomes. 185 In fact, errors should be expected. That is why the
system operation and outputs need to be supervised by humans.
However, errors are not a problem in the AI context, they are
the fodder for improvement. 186 Moreover, AI has tools to help it
proactively identify problems in its data or analysis. 187 Take, as
illustration, an AI application that predicts recidivism. The
system can be linked with real-time outcome data and
information related to programs the defendant was exposed to
while in custody and under probation supervision. 188 While

183.
See Forget Spell Check: Microsoft Word Uses AI to Improve Writing
Style, NET IMPERATIVE (May 8, 2019), http://www.netimperative.com/2019/05
/forget-spell-check-microsoft-word-uses-ai-to-improve-writing-style/
(last
visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“Now Microsoft is adapting Ideas to Microsoft Word,
offering ideas to enhance each user’s own writing style.”) [https://perma.cc
/QB8T-M5HB].
184.
See id. (describing Ideas, an artificial intelligence that looks closely
at language, suggesting more appropriate words for concise, readable, and
inclusive writing). The author acknowledges that spell and grammar check are
invaluable resources to him.
185.
See Rouse, supra note 179 (discussing the programming mechanisms
of AI that allow it to acquire data and create rules called algorithms, which
allow it to turn the data into actionable information).
186.
See Dom Galeon, New Algorithm Lets AI Learn from Mistakes,
Become a Little More Human, FUTURISM (Mar. 2, 2018), https://futurism.com
/ai-learn-mistakes-openai (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“In any case, as OpenAI’s
simulations demonstrated, [the algorithm OpenAI developed] can be quite
helpful at ‘encouraging’ AI agents to learn even from their mistakes . . . the
major difference being that AIs don’t get frustrated like the rest of us feeble
folks.”) [https://perma.cc/99GZ-LB6S].
187.
See Tom Abate, UMass Amherst Develop Algorithms that Train AI to
Avoid Specific Misbehaviors, STAN. NEWS (Nov. 21, 2019), https://
news.stanford.edu/2019/11/21/Stanford-helps—train-ai-not-misbehave/ (last
visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“Robots, self-driving cars and other intelligent machines
could become better-behaved thanks to a new way to help machine learning
designers build AI applications with safeguards against specific, undesirable
outcomes such as racial and gender bias.”) [https://perma.cc/7DQV-3XVM].
188.
See id. (“But as AI starts handling sensitive tasks, such as helping
pick which prisoners get bail, policy makers are insisting that computer
scientists offer assurances that automated systems have been designed to
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historically that data was too voluminous and varied for human
processing, it goes to AI’s strengths. 189
If a defendant’s outcome is different from what was
projected by the AI, the system can identify that and learn from
it, optimizing its predictions moving forward. 190 Maybe a
different result was due to the defendant’s involvement in a
promising new treatment program or changes in the defendant’s
living situation. 191 Either way, the new information can be
incorporated into the AI’s future predictions. Also built into the
AI analysis could be filters for data or a type of analysis that
may be problematic. The system can identify information that
may be tainted by racism, or other bias. The system could
exclude the suspect information from analysis and subject it to
separate examination—so, it too, can be learned from.
B. Concerns with Artificial Intelligence
AI can be programmed to teach itself, to a degree. For the
most part it comes out of the box—ironically—unintelligent. 192
It must be trained by humans so it knows how to process the
minimize, if not completely avoid, unwanted outcomes such as excessive risk
or racial and gender bias.”).
189.
See Rouse, supra note 179 (“While the huge volume of data that’s
being created on a daily basis would bury a human researcher, AI applications
that use machine learning can take that data and quickly turn it into
actionable information.”).
190.
See id. (describing the learning process of AI in detail).
191.
See Thomas H. Cohen, Christopher T. Lowenkamp, & Scott W.
VanBenschoten, Does Change in Risk Matter?, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
263, 263–96 (2016) (discussing one of the most effective methods for reducing
criminal behavior, a treatment paradigm that employs actuarial risk
assessment instruments so that officers may determine which factors, when
changed, will reduce the likelihood for recidivism).
192.
See Adriana Braga & Robert K. Logan, The Emperor of Strong AI Has
No Clothes: Limits to Artificial Intelligence, INFO., Nov. 27, 2017, at 2, https://
www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/8/4/156/htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“[A]rtificial
intelligence (AI) or its stronger version artificial general intelligence (AGI) can
never rise to the level of human intelligence because computers are not capable
of many of the essential characteristics of human intelligence, despite their
ability to out-perform us as far as logic and computation are concerned.”)
[https://perma.cc/2Y5H-YREA].
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data it will encounter. That training process is one of the
reasons critics have concerns about using AI in criminal
justice. 193
The thinking goes that if our current understanding of
crime is incomplete, 194 which it is, or tainted by bias,
unconsciously or otherwise, those deficiencies will be embedded
in the AI via training. The negative effect will be exacerbated as
AI processes historical data that itself is presumably marred by
ignorance and bias. 195 This point, or an ancillary one that AI
simply does not work, was highlighted in an experiment
conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 196
The ACLU used AI facial recognition software to compare
25,000 police mugshots to the 535 members of Congress, 197

193.
See Brian Charles, NYPD’s Big Artificial-Intelligence Reveal,
GOVERNING (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justicesafety/gov-new-york-police-nypd-data-artificial-intelligence-patternizr.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“Any predictive policing platform runs the risks of
perpetuating disparities because of the over-policing of communities of color
that will inform their inputs. To ensure fairness, the NYPD should be
transparent . . . and allow independent researchers to audit these systems
before they are tested on New Yorkers.”) [https://perma.cc/DBP5-AZG7].
194.
See John Gramlich, 5 Facts About Crime in The U.S., PEW RES. CTR.
(Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/17/factsabout-crime-in-the-u-s/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“Most crimes are not
reported to police, and most reported crimes are not solved.”) [https://perma.cc
/4ZAN-HYSR].
195.
See Florian Dietz, Why Your AI Might Be Racist and What To Do
About It, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Nov. 9, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com
/why-your-ai-might-be-racist-and-what-to-do-about-it-c081288f600a
(last
visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“It’s a general principle of training an AI: garbage in,
garbage out.”) [https://perma.cc/AWU7-C6SJ].
196.
See Kat Tenbarge, Amazon Responds to ACLU’s Highly Critical
Report of Its Rekognition Software, INVERSE (July 26, 2018), https://
www.inverse.com/article/47456-aclu-calls-for-moratorium-on-governmentuse-of-face-surveillance-technology (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (describing the
ACLU’s experiment on Amazon’s Rekognition program, a facial recognition
software that incorrectly matched 28 members of Congress to mugshots)
[https://perma.cc/USN4-SXXE].
197.
See Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28
Members of Congress with Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://
www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/amazonsface-recognition-falsely-matched-28 (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (describing a
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producing 28 false positive matches—forty percent of which
involved minorities. 198 The seller of the face-recognition
software countered that the ACLU did not use the application
correctly, relied on settings (a confidence level) too low for the
task, and applied inadequate training to the project. 199
Another misunderstanding about AI is that it is inseparable
from its constituent elements. There have been several reports
suggesting AI has been used, with poor results, to make bail and
sentencing decisions. 200 First and foremost, there are no AI
courts nor any computer judges. 201 Bail and sentencing
decisions are only made by humans. 202
study completed by the ACLU which shows deficiencies in Amazon’s facial
recognition technology) [https://perma.cc/TFR9-LLL7].
198.
Presumably, the remaining ninety-five percent of the 535 members of
Congress were not misidentified as being among the mugshot photos.
199.
See Tenbarge, supra note 196 (detailing what Amazon claims was
incorrect in the ACLU’s study).
200.
See Jason Tashea, Courts Are Using AI to Sentence Criminals. That
Must Stop Now, WIRED (Apr. 17, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017
/04/courts-using-ai-sentence-criminals-must-stop-now/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2020) (describing how courts use algorithms to determine a defendant’s risk
and describing several consequences of this practice) [https://perma.cc/M5P3WYGX]; Karen Hao, AI Is Sending People to Jail—and Getting It Wrong, MIT
TECH. REV. (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612775
/algorithms-criminal-justice-ai/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (describing criminal
risk assessment algorithms and issues associated with using them in
sentencing) [https://perma.cc/J7TY-ULXT]; Noel L. Hillman, The Use of
Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, A.B.A. (Jan. 1, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_journal
/2019/winter/the-use-artificial-intelligence-gauging-risk-recidivism/
(last
visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“Yes, there is an eerie similarity between the storyline
in Minority Report and judicial reliance on AI at sentencing.”) [https://
perma.cc/GJ3Z-RMNJ].
201.
See Stephanie Condon, AI in the Court: Are Robot Judges Next?,
ZDNET (Jan. 22, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/ai-in-thecourt-are-robot-judges-next/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (describing
technological advances that may sound like a “digital judge” but standing for
the proposition that there are no digital courthouses or judges in the United
States) [https://perma.cc/DL7N-4D6A].
202.
See Laura Reynolds, The Role of Judges in Criminal Cases, CHRON,
https://work.chron.com/role-judges-criminal-cases-6696.html (last visited Feb.
3, 2020) (defining the role of the judge in the sentencing phase) [https://
perma.cc/Q2HE-L36G].
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Also, if you go deeper than the headlines, the concern is not
about AI directly. 203 Instead, the issue is algorithms which are
used to predict defendants’ ongoing danger to the community. 204
Algorithms are steps or formulas to process information and
solve problems. 205 Algorithms predate computers by a
millennium and have been used in various capacities in criminal
justice for nearly one hundred years. 206 AI uses algorithms but
is not an algorithm itself. 207 The difference is more than
semantics when you are trying to isolate and resolve issues of
concern. 208
The propriety of assessing recidivism risk at sentencing is
a policy decision. 209 For sentencing, Congress has resolved the
issue in the affirmative 210, requiring that judges take ongoing
criminal risk into account. 211 Whether algorithms are reliable

203.
See Hao, supra note 200 (noting concerns not about AI itself, but
issues with using certain algorithms that rely on historical data).
204.
See id. (describing the concerns with using the algorithm to predict
recidivism rates).
205.
See
Margaret
Rouse,
Algorithm,
TECHTARGET,
https://
whatis.techtarget.com/definition/algorithm (last updated Mar. 2019) (last
visited Feb. 3, 2020) (defining algorithm) [https://perma.cc/5QX3-CM5L].
206.
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS PROB. & PRETRIAL SERVS.
OFFICE, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL POST CONVICTION RISK ASSESSMENT 4–
5 (2018) (documenting history of using algorithms in criminal justice systems).
207.
See Berend Berendsen, What’s the Difference Between Artificial
Intelligence, Machine Learning and Algorithms?, WIDGET BRAIN (Nov. 15,
2019), https://widgetbrain.com/difference-between-ai-ml-algorithms/ (last
visited Feb. 3, 2020) (explaining the difference between AI, machine learning,
and algorithms) [https://perma.cc/EZ8X-USQB].
208.
See Hao, supra note 200 (focusing not on concerns with using AI itself,
but on concerns with the data that goes into the algorithm).
209.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2018) (showing that Congress thought
judges should consider when sentencing, the risk that the defendant would
commit more crimes).
210.
See id. (requiring judges to take recidivism risk into account in
sentencing).
211.
Assessments of criminogenic risk influence the type, amount and
timing of rehabilitative programming afforded a defendant while imprisoned
and while supervised in the community. Risk assessment tools like those used
by federal probation are dynamic and a defendant’s risk level, and in turn
likelihood to return to prison, through reduced contact with anti-social peers.
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depends on the instrument. 212 The most accurate instruments
have a strong theoretical basis, are backed by robust empirical
study, validated, and periodically revalidated for the specific
task for which it is assigned. 213 These instruments tend to not
only be more predictive than other instruments but more
predictive than professional judgement alone. 214 Consequently,
there is an argument that sentencing could be enhanced if
informed by reliable algorithms. 215
Nonetheless, concerns persist that algorithms could
perpetuate, even worsen, racial bias. 216 Quality instruments
address the bias concerns and show outputs and validation by
race and other factors of concern. 217 For example, a study of the
PCRA, the instrument developed and validated for purposes of
post-conviction supervision of federal defendants, found that
“application of well-established principles of psychological
science revealed little evidence of test bias for the PCRA—the
instrument strongly predicts arrest for both Black and White
offenders and a given score has essentially the same meaning—
i.e., same probability of recidivism.” 218
The evolutionary nature of the tools and the important
social issues we ask them to help us with understandably

212.
See Jennifer Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, And
Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 37
(2016) (explaining the differences between poor and good quality instruments).
213.
See id. (explaining what makes a quality instrument).
214.
See SARAH PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., DEMYSTIFYING RISK ASSESSMENT
11–12 (2017) (explaining that data-driven tools can improve decision making).
215.
See Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 212 (“To be clear, we are not
offering a blanket endorsement of the use of risk assessment instruments to
inform sentencing.”).
216.
See Beth Schwartzapfel, Can Racist Algorithms Be Fixed?, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (July 1, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019
/07/01/can-racist-algorithms-be-fixed (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (discussing a
“simple” theoretical instrument, using static risk factors only, and that was
not used operationally) [https://perma.cc/QGX5-ZRZ6].
217.
See Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 212 (taking the position that
well-made instruments can address concerns of racial bias).
218.
Id.
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produce questions and criticisms. 219 A single report or study
alone is not enough to provide a definitive assessment of the
technology. Consequently, replication of study results is critical
to securing a firm understanding. 220
Another very important issue related to use of algorithms,
and that would also apply to AI, is transparency. 221 The law
related to defendants’ due process rights relative to use of
algorithms and AI at sentencing is still forming. 222 Presumably,
due process will require some degree of disclosure of source code
and validation materials. Placing all operating information
related to AI and algorithms in a “black box” would create
problems, not just from a due-process perspective but for the
effectiveness of the technology as well. 223 Black boxes will
undermine trust in AI and algorithm outputs. 224 Not allowing
interested parties to examine the technology will deny system
administrators access to the very people who could give them
the most valuable feedback. Moreover, no one benefits from a
219.
See generally Anthony Flores, Kristin Bechtel & Christopher
Lowenkamp, False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder
to “Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future
Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks.,” 80 FED. PROB. J. 38 (2016)
(responding to social criticism from a report that claimed one system of
algorithms showed bias against Black defendants).
220.
See id. at 38 (“We think ProPublica’s report was based faulty
statistics and data analysis, and that the report failed to show that the
COMPAS itself is racially biased, let alone that other risk instruments are
biased.”).
221.
See John Villasenor & Virginia Foggo, Algorithms and Sentencing:
What Does Due Process Require?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 21, 2019), https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/03/21/algorithms-and-sentencingwhat-does-due-process-require/ (raising the issue of how much transparency
into the details of the algorithms should criminal defendants receive) [https://
perma.cc/689R-G4WA].
222.
See id. (noting many questions and concerns that still have to be
addressed by the use of AI in sentencing).
223.
See Flores, Bechtel & Lowenkamp, supra note 219 (standing for the
proposition that criticism of algorithms leads to more effective instruments).
224.
See Vyacheslav Polonski, People don’t trust AI—here’s how we can
change that, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 9, 2018, 8:12 AM), http://
theconversation.com/people-dont-trust-ai-heres-how-we-can-change-that87129 (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (stating that a lack of transparency in
algorithms contributes to distrust in AI) [https://perma.cc/7PQH-3EDZ].
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defect going undetected—especially one that could result in a
defendant being given an inappropriate sentence.
Those interests will have to be balanced against the needs
for security 225 and property rights of proprietors of the AI
application and related algorithms. Development of AI and
algorithms costs time and money. 226 That investment could be
lost by companies if their source code became publicly
available. 227 One suggestion is to require disclosure only to
auditors or certifying officials. 228 However, that may not satisfy
interested parties, nor adequately address due process concerns.
Another idea is to require AI and algorithm outputs to be
sufficiently detailed as to the factors considered and reasons for
whatever recommendation is made by the technology. 229 The
problem is that if someone has cause to question the algorithm,
it would likely have cause to question its entire output—
explanation included.
It is possible that AI and algorithms could become so prolific
that defendants, or at least defense attorneys, will have their
225.
There is evidence that some criminals, with knowledge how the
criminal justice system operates, will manipulate that information to their
own advantage. See Danielle Woodward, Queens Lawyer Lied In Plot To
Reduce Client’s Sentence: Feds, PATCH (Mar. 26, 2018, 2:27 PM), https://
patch.com/new-york/foresthills/queens-lawyer-lied-plot-reduce-clientssentence-feds (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“The Forest Hills lawyer allegedly
fudged his client’s addictive past to get him into a rehab program that would
cut down his prison time.”) [https://perma.cc/ZRY2-THLS].
226.
See David Coveney, How Much Does Code Cost?, INTERCONNECT/IT
(June 1, 2008), https://interconnectit.com/news/2008/06/01/how-much-doescode-cost/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (explaining the time and money
investment required to code) [https://perma.cc/T8AF-JP7H].
227.
See Kartik Hosanagar & Vivian Jair, We Need Transparency in
Algorithms, But Too Much Can Backfire, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 23, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/07/we-need-transparency-in-algorithms-but-too-muchcan-backfire (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (examining the line between promoting
transparency and allowing companies to realize the full potential of their
intellectual property) [https://perma.cc/HBV3-QC7E].
228.
See id. (“Some lawmakers have proposed a compromise, suggesting
that the source code be revealed to regulators or auditors in the event of a
serious problem, and this adjudicator will assure consumers that the process
is fair.”).
229.
See id. (stating that transparency can build trust in certain
situations, but that it could cost businesses money or opens it to exploitation).
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own versions of the technology. That will mean judges will have
to preside over a battle of the algorithms or AI systems. Not an
efficient option.
The seemingly unavoidable answer is engagement and
transparency. 230 Clearly, both due process and property rights
will have to be balanced. It will be a problem from a societal
perspective to infringe on property rights and possibly prevent
investments for future improvement of AI. It will take some
ingenuity but there must be a way to ensure defendants are
offered adequate understanding of the system influencing the
sentence they receive, while adequately protecting property
rights and securing the system. 231 It behooves advocates and
critics alike of the technology to work together and find an
appropriate solution.
C. Benefits of Artificial Intelligence
AI, notwithstanding unresolved legal issues, is a very viable
tool to enhance sentencing. In terms of improving the
sentencing decision itself, AI can provide the court and the
parties more information with which to contextualize the
sentencing decision. The most important document at
sentencing is the presentence report prepared by a probation
officer for the court. 232 The report focuses exclusively on the
defendant and federal offense of conviction. 233

230.
See Polonski, supra note 224 (explaining why people are reluctant to
trust AI and proposes a way to change its perception).
231.
See Jim Mcdonough, How Companies Can Provide Security
Transparency to Customers and Prospects, THREAT STACK (June 21, 2017),
https://www.threatstack.com/blog/how-companies-can-provide-securitytransparency-to-customers-and-prospects (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (providing
several ideas pertaining to how companies can provide security transparency
to their customers) [https://perma.cc/HA8Z-YNRT].
232.
See CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE HISTORY OF THE
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 7 (2008), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj
/documents/the_history.pdf (“[T]he PSI remains the most influential
document in the sentencing of criminal defendants.”) [https://perma.cc/T5S38CFW].
233.
See id. at 3–4 (describing offense-based reports).
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Historically, little or no information was provided in
relation to other similarly situated defendants, in part because
the information was not readily available. 234 The guidelines only
provide insights into similarities across cases based on the
Commission’s assessment of the severity of federal offenses and
criminal histories alone. 235 The guidelines do not take into
account defendants’ personal histories, and group together
offenses with markedly different statutory violations and prior
criminal conduct to establish offense levels and criminal history
categories. 236
With AI, every presentence report can be scanned and
parsed based on relevant sentencing factors not just related to
the federal offense and prior record but personal and family
information as well. The data does not have to be restricted to
current cases and can include the millions of reports completed
in previous years and electronically stored by the United States
Probation and Pretrial Services System. 237 Further, probation
authorities have information on any sentences already imposed,
and defendants’ adjustment to prison and supervision, and
whether they satisfied restitution, and any other sanction. 238

234.

See id. at 2–3 (describing offender-based reports).
See Federal Sentencing: The United States Sentencing Guidelines,
FED. DEFENDERS N.Y., https://federaldefendersny.org/information-for-clientand-families/federal-sentencing.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) [hereinafter
Federal Sentencing] (“The Guidelines are set out in a chart, which has two
parts: (1) the offense level and (2) prior criminal history category.”) [https://
perma.cc/95DS-7AXZ].
236.
See id. (explaining that “[t]he criminal history category is calculated
by giving ‘points’ to each prior conviction”). For example, depending on the
circumstances, a drug offense, robbery offense and other offenses could have
the same offense level. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A–C (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (providing the framework for calculating the
number of points assigned to the offense at issue). Defendants with a different
number of arrests, convictions and sentences could still be in the same
criminal history category. See id. § 4 (providing the framework for calculating
the number of points assigned to a defendant’s past criminal offenses).
237.
See Probation and Pretrial Services-Mission, supra note 27 (noting
that United States Probation and Pretrial Services “gather[s] and verif[ies]
information about persons who come before the courts”).
238.
See id. (same).
235.
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The consolidated data can be made searchable so that
judges, attorneys, defendants, and probation officers can gather
information on whatever specific issue is relevant. As an
illustration, take a case where the defendant has unusual family
circumstances, such as being the sole caretaker for young,
special-needs children. With the AI data, the judge could
determine the extent such circumstances influenced other
sentences imposed. The judge can also determine how those
defendants fared after sentencing. The variation, sentencing
disparity, that has for so long been considered the bane of the
system, can now offer a natural laboratory to see what impact
the variation had on outcomes.
For data reliability purposes, AI could offer links to the
exact case language. 239 The technology can even support an
identification protocol to mask the names of previous
defendants for privacy purposes. 240 Again, none of this
information would be binding on the court, parties, or the
Sentencing Commission, but it would undoubtedly be useful.
AI could also streamline transfer of data related to the
sentence to the Sentencing Commission for research and
reporting. 241 Since the data could be shared in other formats
that judges and others find useful, it will be easier to identify
any accuracy problems and allow the information to be used
more readily.
The flexibility of the process is important because the more
the data is used and reviewed, the more likely any data quality
problems will be detected. 242 This, in turn, will help the
Commission with the reports it submits to Congress and the
public. Moreover, it will help judges, through automated
reconciliation, to know that data about the sentences they

239.
See Rouse, supra note 179 (noting that AI can process large volumes
of “data quickly and turn it into actionable information”).
240.
See How Actual Intelligence is Transforming Artificial Intelligence
(AI), supra note 165 (providing information about the capabilities of AI and
stating that “[i]f you can outsource a task, you can probably automate it”).
241.
See Rouse, supra note 179 (emphasizing that AI can process data
much more quickly than humans can).
242.
See id. (describing the learning and self-correction processes of AI).
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impose are being correctly reported to, and by, the Sentencing
Commission.
AI can also improve the procedures surrounding
sentencing. Presently, presentence reports contain data from
multiple sources that are manually assembled by probation
officers. 243 The work is time consuming, usually taking ninety
days. 244 Those ninety days can be agonizing for a defendant and
his or her family, not knowing what to expect at sentencing. The
Supreme Court has noted that a prolonged wait for sentence has
a “corrosive impact.” 245 There have been a high number of
suicides among pretrial and presentence defendants. 246 There
are likely many factors contributing to that problem. Even if the
stress of waiting on sentencing is not one of them, it surely is
not helping the situation.
AI can both speed up the presentence process and provide
defendants and family members information to better help them
prepare for sentencing. The speed can come from AI’s ability to
assemble information from multiple sources, now manually
gathered. 247 The information includes charging and plea
documents from the court record, prior record information from
law enforcement and other courts, an interview with the

243.
See generally OFFICE OF PROBATION & PRETRIAL SERVS., PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT (2006), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/library
/2013/02/26/Horvath_presentence.pdf (outlining a probation officer’s
responsibilities in compiling a presentence investigation report) [https://
perma.cc/KU64-PW7A].
244.
See Federal Sentencing, supra note 235 (“Typically, will take place
ninety days after a guilty plea or guilty verdict.”).
245.
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
246.
See James M. Byrne, New Defendants, New Responsibilities:
Preventing Suicide Among Alleged Sex Offenders in the Federal Pretrial
System, 73 FED. PROB. J., Sept. 2009, at 83 (noting that there is a higher risk
of suicide among “sex defendants on pretrial supervision at the federal level”);
Maria Cramer, A Courtroom Suicide Shows the Court’s Unpreparedness to
Deal with Mentally Ill Defendants, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 12, 2016), https://
apps.bostonglobe.com/spotlight/the-desperate-and-the-dead/series/courts/
(last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (noting that “[c]ourt personnel are, in the main,
poorly equipped to deal with mental illness”) [https://perma.cc/J93S-HJGL].
247.
See Rouse, supra note 179 (emphasizing that AI can process data
much more quickly than humans can).
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defendant and verification efforts by probation officers. 248 The
information can be formatted to promote better use. For
example, English is a second language for many defendants. 249
AI can provide copies in the defendant’s language of preference
and English. 250 It can also convert language to the defendants
reading level and allow accommodation for those with special
needs. Building on that example, a visually impaired defendant
could be given the options of the report in large font, Braille, or
even an audio version of the report via text-to-voice
technology. 251
The speed of AI also applies to document production.
Presently, once a defendant is sentenced, he or she must wait to
receive official documentation of the sentence in the mail. 252 AI
could record the sentencing and produce documents on the spot.
The defendant could walk out of the courtroom with an official
record of sentence that could be formatted to address any special
needs the defendant may have and to facilitate understanding
of the documents.
As to additional information the defendant may need, AI
can help provide designation information if the defendant is
248.
See OFFICE OF PROBATION & PRETRIAL SERVS., supra note 243, at II-2,
II-17, III-8, III-17, III-24 (outlining the contents of the presentence
investigation report).
249.
See John Bainbridge Safford, No Comprendo: The Non-EnglishSpeaking Defendant and the Criminal Process, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
14, 15 (1977) (“Minorities for whom English is not the principal language or
who speak such unusual dialects of English as to cloud understanding and
communication make up a discouraging proportion of offenders.”).
250.
See Simon Davies, Artificial Intelligence Is Changing the Translation
Industry. But Will It Work?, DIGITALIST MAG. (July 6, 2018), https://
www.digitalistmag.com/digital-economy/2018/07/06/artificial-intelligence-ischanging-translation-industry-but-will-it-work-06178661 (last visited Feb. 2,
2020) (discussing AI’s ability to translate languages) [https://perma.cc/SRP4URBJ].
251.
See id. (discussing the capabilities of AI translators).
252.
See, e.g., Jerry Zremski, Chris Collins’ Imprisonment Delayed Until
April 21, THE BUFFALO NEWS (Mar. 2, 2020), https://buffalonews.com/2020/03
/02/collins-imprisonment-delayed-until-april-21/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2020)
(discussing how a defendant would report to prison weeks after pleading guilty
because of the time the Bureau of Prisons would need to process him) [https://
perma.cc/J3QQ-9WAW].
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facing a prison sentence. 253 Historically, defendants had to wait
weeks after sentencing to find out what prison facility they have
been assigned to by the BOP. 254 It is only after learning his or
her classification score and which facility that the defendant can
really prepare for the transition.
For the defendant and his or her family, knowing where the
defendant will be, the programming the defendant will be
eligible for, and other important issues will be useful, and shape
whether they feel they have been treated fairly or not. 255 At the
same time, there may be benefits to the government as pretrial
detention facilities have traditionally been more expensive than
BOP institutions. 256 Faster designations could lead to more
economical placement.
253.
See Designation, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov
/inmates/custody_and_care/designations.jsp (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (noting
that, currently, “[u]pon sentencing in a Federal District Court, the Bureau of
Prisons has the sole responsibility in determining where an offender will be
designated for service of his/her sentence”) [https://perma.cc/D5BA-L7H4].
254.
See, e.g., Zremski, supra note 252 (discussing how a defendant would
report to prison weeks after pleading guilty because the Bureau of Prisons
would need to process him).
255.
The BOP posts its policies and procedures, along with other
information, on its website. See generally Designation, supra note 253. An
inmate’s classification score and assigned institution are major influences on
the defendant’s experience as an inmate. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
P5100.08, PROGRAM STATEMENT (2006), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat
/5100_008cn.pdf (detailing the factors that influence a defendant’s placement,
including the defendant’s classification which dictates which group the
defendant will be placed in “based on their security and program needs”)
[https://perma.cc/6HRV-A65W]. There are different types of institutions from
the proverbial “Club Fed” camp to ultra-secure “Supermaxes.” See Prison
Security Levels, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics
/statistics_inmate_sec_levels.jsp (last updated Apr. 11, 2020) (last visited Feb.
4, 2020) (providing statistics on prison security levels) [https://perma.cc/945SNJ69]. In relation to the Club-Fed characterization, not all inmates view it
that way. See Lisa Depaulo, Here’s What White Collar Prison Is Really Like for
Three High-Profile Criminals, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 31, 2013, 9:57 AM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/white-collar-prisons-2013-12 (last visited Feb. 4,
2020) (quoting an incarcerated man as saying, “That whole Club Fed
mentality, that shit that they portray in the press, is complete nonsense”)
[https://perma.cc/8FGE-4C28].
256.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-472, PRISONER
OPERATIONS: UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE COULD BETTER ESTIMATE
COST SAVINGS AND MONITOR EFFORTS TO INCREASE EFFICIENCIES 17 (2016)
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These are but a few of the options that can be pursued in
the federal tradition of using technology to improve sentencing.
VI. Conclusion
The Monty Python skit cited at the beginning of this
article 257 demonstrates the irony of improving things around a
problem, but not the problem itself. That irony is not lost on
those involved with federal sentencing. General dissatisfaction
with sentencing continues notwithstanding repeated reforms
and spending billions of tax dollars. 258 It does not seem to matter
whose discretion applies:
juries, Congress, judges, or
prosecutors. Sentencing remains a discretionary practice
without ultimate outcome measures—and that seems to be the
problem.
We are unable, empirically, to measure the impact of
sentencing in terms of community safety, restoration of victims
or even rehabilitation. We have some figures, such as the cost of
imprisonment, financial sanctions collected and recidivism
rates (measured different ways). But we are only feeling parts
of the elephant in the dark. We do not have the complete picture.
The progress that has been made in terms of sentencing
transparency, structuring of judicial decision making, and
research has been made possible due to technological
innovation.
It is also technological innovation that is needed for federal
sentencing to move to the next level, a level where it can better
understand its impact, its costs, and its options. AI may be the
very thing the federal system needs to improve sentencing. AI
and associated algorithms may be uniquely situated to address
concerns about racism and discrimination in federal

(acknowledging the United States Marshal Service’s dependency on private
jails and how those facilities tend to be more expensive than government jails
due to their location, bed guarantees and other factors).
257.
Gilliam, supra note 1.
258.
See supra notes 9–11 (discussing the public’s concerns about federal
sentencing).
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sentencing. 259 “For those who wish to reduce discriminatory
behavior, this is a massive opportunity.” 260 We literally see into
AI’s logic and use of information, how and why it came to its
decisions. 261 Its approach can be modified based on outcomes
and adjustments easily made, and documented, if bias or other
distortion is detected. 262 AI has no ego and does not fatigue.
Consequently, any changes will be implemented without
reservation or resentment. That predictability, transparency,
and objectiveness has not been offered before by any other actor
in sentencing.
To build a greater empirical base and scientific
understanding of the key components of sentencing will require
more and better data. The data must also be presented in a way,
and with such reliability, that it facilitates its use by
practitioners, government officials, academics, and the public
alike. AI has done that in other areas and can do it for federal
sentencing.
A few ways in which AI can be used in the short-term were
discussed in this Article, but that in no way reflects AI’s full
potential. Work groups within and across the agencies and
interested parties could better plan for AI’s use and begin
implementation. The tasks for these groups, however, cannot
merely be how to use the technology. They should be charged
with helping potential users move past the myths surrounding
the technology, myths that exaggerate both its capabilities and
risks. The groups must also formally take into account ethical,
legal, and financial considerations related to the technology.
Not adopting AI will mean federal sentencing will remain
on the carousel of unmeasured reforms. Simply shifting
discretion and making other changes without fully knowing the
impact can be more than ineffectual: It can undermine trust in
259.
See Kleinberg et al., supra note 167, at 164 (“[Algorithms] have the
potential to make important strides in combatting discrimination . . . .”).
260.
Id. at 163.
261.
But see Rouse, supra note 179 (explaining that sometimes “it can be
difficult to explain how the decision was arrived at because the AI
tools . . . operate by teasing out subtle correlations between thousands of
variables”).
262.
See Galeon, supra note 186 (noting that AI can learn from its
failures).
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the sentencing system. If we continue to treat sentencing
exclusively as an art, we must expect the art critics and
emotionally driven assessments of the system’s value.
The tools are now available to make federal sentencing both
an art and a science. Adding more science will clearly increase
value and lend greater support to the art component that will
remain.

